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Inside the Taft Court: Lessons from the Docket Books 
        Barry Cushman* 
 
For many years, the docket books kept by certain of the Taft Court Justices have been 
held by the Office of the Curator of the Supreme Court. Though the existence of these docket 
books had been brought to the attention of the scholarly community, access to them was highly 
restricted. In April of 2014, however, the Court adopted new guidelines designed to increase 
access to the docket books for researchers. This article offers a report and analysis based on a 
review of all of the Taft Court docket books held by the Office of the Curator, which are the only 
such docket books known to have survived. 
For the years of Chief Justice Williams Howard Taft’s tenure, the Curator’s office holds 
Justice Pierce Butler’s docket books for the 1922 through 1924 Terms, and Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone’s docket books for the 1924-1929 Terms. Each of these docket books records the votes 
that each of the Court’s Justices cast in cases when they met to discuss them in conference. 
Justice Stone’s docket books also contain occasional notes of remarks made by colleagues during 
the conference discussion. Unfortunately, Stone’s handwriting frequently is quite difficult to 
decipher, and as a result the content of these notes too often remains obscure. Justice Butler’s 
handwriting is more readily understood, however, and fortunately he often used the pages of his 
docket books to keep remarkably detailed and informative notes of the conference deliberations.1 
                                                          
*John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. 
Author’s Note: Thanks to Matthew Hofstedt, Devon Burge, Franz Jantzen, Lauren Morrell, Nikki 
Peronace, and Erin Huckle, all of the Office of the Curator of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, for their kind hospitality and splendid assistance with the Taft Court docket books; to 
Margaret Adema, Jon Ashley, Dwight King, Kent Olson, and Cathy Palombi for their cheerful 
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These docket books have been examined and reported on before, but for limited purposes 
and therefore to a limited extent. Dean Robert Post, who has been commissioned to write the 
volume on the Taft Court for the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, has presented an illuminating statistical analysis of the aggregate conference 
vote data.2 Yet Dean Post’s scholarship addresses the particular and qualitative dimensions of the 
conference records for only a relatively small number of cases.3 This article seeks to improve our 
                                                          
and excellent research assistance; and to participants in the Notre Dame Law School Faculty 
Colloquium for valuable comments and conversation. 
1 The Butler and Stone docket books remained in the Supreme Court building after each of these 
Justices died while in office. It is not known why these volumes were retained, nor why the set of 
Butler docket books is not complete. In 1972 all of the “historic” docket books held in the 
Supreme Court building were boxed up by the Court’s Marshal at the order of Chief Justice 
Warren Burger, and were later transferred to the Curator’s Office. Email communication from 
Matthew Hofstedt, Associate Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, Aug 26, 2014. 
2 Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, 
and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 Minn L Rev 1267, 1309-55 (2001). 
3 See Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative 
State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 Wm and Mary L Rev 1, 36 n 119 (2006) (discussing 
Gambino v United States, 275 US 310 (1927)); Post, 48 Wm and Mary L Rev at 101 n 343 
(discussing Byars v United States, 273 US 28 (1927) and Agnello v United States, 269 US 20 
(1925)); Post, 48 Wm and Mary L Rev at 111 n 368 (discussing New York v Zimmerman, 278 US 
63 (1928)); Post, 48 Wm and Mary L Rev at 121 n 403 (again discussing Byars); Post, 48 Wm 
and Mary L Rev at 124 n 406 (discussing Carroll v United States, 267 US 132 (1925)); Post, 48 
Wm and Mary L Rev at 134 n 442 (again discussing Agnello); Post, 48 Wm and Mary L Rev at 
142 n 470 and n 471 (discussing Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438 (1927)); Post, 48 Wm 
and Mary L Rev at 160 n 537 (discussing Donnelley v United States, 276 US 505 (1928)); Post, 
48 Wm and Mary L Rev at 161 n 537 (discussing Ziang Sung Wan v United States, 266 US 1 
(1924); See also Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 Duke 
L J 1513, 1535 n 84 (2002) (discussing Metcalf v Mitchell, 269 US 514 (1926)); Post 51 Duke L 
J at 1565 n 181 (discussing Chicago Board of Trade v Olsen, 262 US 1 (1923)); Post 51 Duke L 
J at 1595 n 288 (discussing Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co v Brown and Yellow 
Taxicab and Transfer Co, 276 US 518 (1928)); Post 51 Duke L J at 618 n 353 (discussing Texas 
Transport and Terminal Co v New Orleans, 264 US 150 (1924)); Robert C. Post, Defending the 
Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 BU L Rev 1489, 1497 (1998) 
(discussing Chastleton Corp v Sinclair, 264 US 543 (1924)); Post, 78 BU L Rev at 1501 n 77 
(discussing Jay Burns Baking Co v Bryan, 264 US 504 (1924)).  
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qualitative understanding of the Taft Court by examining and analyzing the votes and conference 
discussions in cases of particular interest to legal and constitutional historians. 
This article examines the available docket book entries relevant to what scholars 
commonly regard as the major decisions of the Taft Court.4 This examination includes 117 cases 
concerning areas of law as diverse as the Commerce Clause, the dormant Commerce Clause, 
substantive due process, equal protection, the general law, antitrust, intergovernmental tax 
immunities, criminal procedure, civil rights, and civil liberties. The information in the docket 
books sheds particularly interesting new light on decisions such as Whitney v California,5 Village 
                                                          
4 The cases selected as “major” or “salient” are those that appear regularly in scholarly 
treatments of the Taft Court. See, for example, Peter Renstrom, The Taft Court: Justices, 
Rulings, and Legacy (ABC-CLIO 2003); Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief 
Justice (Simon and Schuster 1964); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to 
Warren (Louisiana State 1958); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 
(Viking 1956); Henry F. Pringle, 2 The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (American 
Political Biography 1939); Post, 48 Wm and Mary L Rev at 1 (cited in note 3); Post, 51 Duke L J 
at 1513 (cited in note 3); Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1267 (cited in note 2); Post, 78 BU L Rev at 
1489 (cited in note 3); Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 Va L Rev 
559 (1997). Scholars may differ concerning the inclusion or exclusion of particular cases from 
this category, and the statistical discussion in the Conclusion must be read with that caveat in 
mind. Notwithstanding such potential differences, however, my effort has been to select cases 
about which I believe there would be a broad measure of agreement. For other scholarship 
exploring judicial behaviour in “major” or “salient” cases, see Forrest Maltzman and Peter J. 
Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 Am Pol 
Sci Rev 581, 589 (1996); Robert H. Dorff and Saul Brenner, Conformity Voting on the United 
States Supreme Court, 54 J Pol 762, 772, 773 (1992); Timothy M. Hagle and Harold J. Spaeth, 
Voting Fluidity and the Attitudinal Model of Supreme Court Decision Making, 44 Western Pol Q 
119, 124 (1991); Saul Brenner, Timothy Hagle, and Harold J. Spaeth, Increasing the Size of 
Minimum Winning Coalitions on the Warren Court, 23 Polity 309 (1990); Saul Brenner, 
Timothy M. Hagle, and Harold J. Spaeth, The Defection of the Marginal Justice on the Warren 
Court, 42 Western Pol Q 409 (1989); Saul Brenner, Fluidity on the Supreme Court: 1956-1967, 
26 Am J Pol Sci 388, 389 (1982); Saul Brenner, Fluidity on the United States Supreme Court: A 
Reexamination, 24 Am J Pol Sci 526, 530 (1980); Ellliot E. Slotnick, Who Speaks for the Court? 
Majority Opinion Assignment from Taft to Burger, 23 Am J Pol Sci 60 (1979). 
5 274 US 357 (1927). 
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of Euclid v Ambler,6 Adkins v Children’s Hospital7 and its successor minimum wage cases,8 
Pierce v Society of Sisters,9 Buck v Bell,10 Frothingham v Mellon,11 Wolff Packing v Court of 
Industrial Relations,12 Fiske v Kansas,13 Tyson & Brothers v Banton,14 Coronado Coal v United 
Mine Workers,15 Corrigan v Buckley,16 Miles v Graham,17 Brooks v United States,18 and Radice 
v New York.19 In addition, for these and the many other cases examined, this article reports on 
whether a unanimous decision also was free from dissent at conference or became so only 
because one or more Justices acquiesced in the judgment of their colleagues, and on whether 
nonunanimous decisions were divided by the same vote and with the same alliances at 
conference. The docket books also provide records of instances in which a case that initially was 
assigned to one Justice later was reassigned to another. These records afford us some insight into 
the kinds of cases in which this tended to occur, and provide an opportunity to document for the 
first time the long held suspicion that the notoriously slow-writing Justice Willis Van Devanter 
frequently was relieved of his opinions by the Chief Justice. 
An examination of the docket books yields a series of interesting and often surprising 
revelations. Among them, we learn that by 1925 five of the sitting Justices believed that the 1923 
                                                          
6 272 US 365 (1926). 
7 261 US 525 (1923). 
8 Donham v West-Nelson Co, 273 US 657 (1927); Murphy v Sardell, 269 US 530 (1925). 
9 268 US 510 (1925). 
10 274 US 200 (1927). 
11 262 US 447 (1923). 
12 262 US 522 (1923). 
13 274 US 380 (1927). 
14 273 US 418 (1927). 
15 268 US 295 (1925). 
16 271 US 623 (1926). 
17 268 US 501 (1925). 
18 267 US 432 (1925). 
19 264 US 292 (1924). 
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decision of Adkins v Children’s Hospital invalidating a minimum wage law for women had been 
wrongly decided, and the precedent survived challenge only because four of those Justices 
continued to adhere to it as a matter of stare decisis. We discover that Justice Brandeis D. 
Brandeis initially was disposed to dissent from rather than to file his landmark concurrence in the 
First Amendment case of Whitney v California. We are informed that the Justices regarded as 
uncontroversial foundational decisions laying the constitutional groundwork for the modern 
welfare state. We learn that the Court’s published opinions present Chief Justice Taft and 
Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and James Clark McReynolds as more favorably inclined 
toward the protection of civil rights and civil liberties than their votes in conference would 
indicate. The docket books also help to resolve a set of lingering questions concerning the 
behind-the-scenes deliberations in the landmark zoning case of Village of Euclid v Ambler. 
A review of the Taft Court docket books also makes possible two contributions to the 
political science literature on judicial behavior. The first is to the scholarship on vote fluidity and 
unanimity norms in the Supreme Court. It is widely agreed that the period from the Chief 
Justiceship of John Marshall through that of Charles Evans Hughes was characterized by a 
“norm of consensus,” “marked by individual justices accepting the Court’s majority opinions.”20 
It is generally believed that this norm of consensus collapsed early in the Chief Justiceship of 
                                                          
20 Pamela C. Corley, Amy Steigerwalt, and Artemus Ward, Revisiting the Roosevelt Court: The 
Critical Juncture from Consensus to Dissensus, 38 J Sup Ct Hist 20, 22 (2013); Mark S. Hurwitz 
and Drew Noble Lanier, I Respectfully Dissent: Consensus, Agendas, and Policymaking on the 
US Supreme Court, 1888-1999, 21 Rev of Pol Research 429, 429 (2004); Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. 
Segal, and Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the US Supreme Court, 45 Am J Pol Sci 
362, 376 (2001); John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme 
Court 1790-1945, 77 Wash U L Q 137, 161-62 (1999); Gregory A. Caldeira and Christopher 
J.W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms in the Supreme Court, 42 Am J Pol Sci 874, 874-75 
(1998); Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein, and William J. Dixon, On the Mysterious Demise of 
Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J Pol 361, 361-62 (1988). 
6 
 
Harlan Fiske Stone,21 though some scholars have pointed to causes that antedate Stone’s 
elevation to the center chair.22 Still others have suggested that there may have been “an earlier, 
more gradual change in norms” on the late Taft and Hughes Courts.23 Political scientists who 
                                                          
21 Herman C. Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937-1947 
40, 251 (1948) (“In 1941 divisive forces of some kind hit the Court full force”); Corley, 
Steigerwalt, and Ward, 38 J Sup Ct Hist at 47 (cited in note 20); Caldeira and Zorn, 42 Am J Pol 
Sci at 874-75 (cited in note 20); Walker, Epstein, and Dixon, 50 J Pol 362; David Danelski, The 
Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process, in Joel B. Grossman and Richard S. 
Wells, eds, Constitutional Law and Judicial Policy Making 175 (New York Wiley 1972).  
22 Compare Stephen C. Halpern and Kenneth N. Vines, The Judges’ Bill and the Role of the US 
Supreme Court, 30 Western Pol Q 471, 481 (1977) (arguing that the enactment of the Judges’ 
bill of 1925, which made the Court’s docket almost entirely discretionary, increased the 
proportion of cases that were legally or politically salient and thus less likely to elicit 
acquiescence from colleagues inclined to disagree with the majority), with Walker, Epstein, and 
Dixon, 50 J Pol at 365-66 (cited in note 20) (agreeing that “it is possible that a discretionary 
docket may be one factor, and a necessary one at that, in maintaining high levels of conflict once 
such patterns are established,” but disputing the contention that the 1925 statute was “the 
primary factor in the alteration of the Court’s consensus norms,” pointing out that “significant 
escalation in both the dissent and concurrence rates did not occur until almost fifteen years” after 
the dramatic increase in the discretionary share of the Court’s docket); accord, Caldeira and 
Zorn, 42 Am J Pol Sci at 875 (cited in note 20); Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1319-31 (cited in note 2) 
(rejecting the Halpern and Vines hypothesis on the ground that unanimity rates in certiorari cases 
were higher than in those falling under the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, and offering 
alternative reasons, such as changes in external circumstances, in Court personnel, and in the 
quality of Taft’s leadership for the decline in unanimity on the late Taft Court). 
23 Caldeira and Zorn, 42 Am J Pol Sci at 892. See also Aaron J. Ley, Kathleen Searles, and 
Cornell W. Clayton, The Mysterious Persistence of Non-Consensual Norms on the US Supreme 
Court, 49 Tulsa L Rev 99, 106 (2013) (“the proportion of unanimous decisions was declining 
prior to Stone’s Chief Justiceship”); Marcus E. Hendershot, Mark S. Hurwitz, Drew Noble 
Lanier, and Richard L. Pacelle Jr, Dissensual Decision Making: Revisiting the Demise of 
Consensual Norms within the US Supreme Court, 20 Pol R Q 1, 8 (2012) (“the Court’s norm of 
consensus was first challenged by growing levels of dissent in the later years of the Hughes 
Court”); David M. O’Brien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On 
Reconsidering the Rise of Individual Opinions, in Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, eds, 
Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches (Chicago 1999) (“the demise 
of the norm of consensus preceded Stone’s chief justiceship”); Stacia L. Haynie, Leadership and 
Consensus on the US Supreme Court, 54 J Pol 1158 (1992) (arguing that Stone consolidated a 
shift in behavioral expectations that began under Hughes). See also Kelsh, 77 Wash U L Q at 
162 (cited in note 20) (“The most unusual thing about the nonunanimity rate for the 1864-1940 
period is that the last ten years saw a sustained increase. This rate was to shoot up dramatically in 
the first years of the Stone Court, but the beginnings of the rise can be seen around 1930”); 
Kelsh, Wash U L Q at 173 (cited in note 20) (“By the 1930s…Justices had fully accepted the 
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have had access to the docket books of various Justices have demonstrated that much of the 
consensus achieved by the Court throughout its history has resulted from the decision of Justices 
who had dissented at conference to join the majority’s ultimate disposition. A large body of 
literature shows that Justices commonly have changed their votes between the conference and 
the final vote on the merits.24 
Of the different types of vote fluidity between the conference vote and the final vote on 
the merits in major Taft Court cases, by far the most common was for a Justice to move from a 
dissenting or passing vote to a vote with the ultimate majority. An examination of the docket 
books permits us to illuminate several features of this phenomenon: the major cases in which it 
occurred; how frequently it occurred; its comparative frequency in major cases as opposed to 
those of lesser salience; the frequency with which each of the Justices did so, and the 
comparative frequency with which they did so in nonsalient cases; and the comparative success 
of Taft Court Justices in preparing majority opinions that would either enlarge the size of the 
ultimate winning coalition or produce ultimate unanimity from a divided conference. Among the 
more interesting findings here is that the member of the Court who most commonly acquiesced 
                                                          
view that separate opinions had a legitimate role in the American legal system.”) Compare 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law and Literature 34 (Harcourt Brace 1931) (characterizing dissenters 
as “irresponsible”). 
24 See, for example, Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth, 45 Am J Pol Sci 362 (cited in note 20) (Waite 
Court); Maltzman and Wahlbeck, 90 Am Pol Sci Rev 581 (cited in note 4) (Burger Court); Dorff 
and Brenner, 54 J Pol 762 (cited in note 4) (Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts); Hagle and 
Spaeth, 44 Western Pol Q 119 (cited in note 4) (Warren Court); Brenner, Hagle, and Spaeth, 23 
Polity 309 (cited in note 4) (Warren Court); Brenner, Hagle, and Spaeth, 42 Western Pol Q 409 
(cited in note 4) (Warren Court); Brenner, 26 Am J Pol Sci 388 (cited in note 4) (Warren Court); 
Saul Brenner, Ideological Voting on the US Supreme Court: A Comparison of the Original Vote 
on the Merits with the Final Vote, 22 Jurimetrics 287 (1982) (Vinson and Warren Courts); 
Brenner, 24 Am J Pol Sci 526 (cited in note 4) (Vinson and Warren Courts); Woodford Howard 
Jr, On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 Am Pol Sci Rev 43 (1968) (Stone and Vinson Courts). 
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in major decisions that he had declined to join at conference was the famously irascible Justice 
McReynolds. 
The second contribution concerns the behavior of newcomers to the Court. In 1958, 
Eloise C. Snyder published an article in which she concluded that new members of the Court 
tended initially to affiliate with a moderate, “pivotal clique” before migrating to a more clearly 
ideological liberal or conservative bloc.25 Seven years later, J. Woodford Howard argued that 
Justice Frank Murphy’s first three terms on the Court were marked by a “freshman effect” 
characterized by an “instability” in his decision making that rendered the Justice “diffident to the 
point of indecisiveness.”26 These studies in turn spawned a literature on the “freshman” or 
“acclimation” effect for Justices new to the Court. These studies generally characterize the 
freshman effect “as consisting of one or more of the following types of behavior: (1) initial 
bewilderment or disorientation, (2) assignment of a lower than average number of opinions to the 
new justices, and (3) an initial tendency on the part of the new justice to join a moderate block of 
justices.”27 While some studies have confirmed the existence of some feature or another of the 
freshman effect,28 others have cast significant doubt on the hypothesis, maintaining that it is 
                                                          
25 Eloise C. Snyder. The Supreme Court as a Small Group, 3 Social Forces 232, 238 (1958). 
26 Woodford Howard, Justice Murphy: The Freshman Years, 18 Vand L Rev 473, 474, 476, 477, 
484, 488, 505 (1965). 
27 Timothy M. Hagle, “Freshman Effects” for Supreme Court Justices, 37 Am J Pol Sci 1142, 
1142 (1993). See also Leigh Anne Williams, Measuring Internal Influence on the Rehnquist 
Court: An Analysis of Non-Majority Opinion Joining Behavior, 68 Ohio St L J 679, 718-19 
(2007); Saul Brenner and Timothy M. Hagle, Opinion Writing and Acclimation Effect, 18 Pol 
Behav 235 (1996); Paul C. Arledge and Edward W. Heck, A Freshman Justice Confronts the 
Constitution: Justice O’Connor and the First Amendment, 45 Western Pol Q 761, 761-62 (1992); 
Edward V. Heck and Melinda Gann Hall, Bloc Voting and the Freshman Justice Revisited, 43 J 
Pol 852, 853-54 (1981); Elliot E. Slotnick, Judicial Career Patterns and Majority Opinion 
Assignment on the Supreme Court, 41 J Pol 640. 641 (1979). 
28  See, for example, Lee Epstein, et al, On the Perils of Drawing Inferences about Supreme 
Court Justices from Their First Few Years of Service, 91 Judicature 168, 179 (2008) (finding 
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evidence of ideological instability in the merits voting of “virtually all” freshman Justices); Mark 
S. Hurwitz and Joseph V Stefko, Acclimation and Attitudes: “Newcomer” Justices and 
Precedent Conformance on the Supreme Court, 57 Pol Res Q 121 (2004) (finding freshman 
effect with respect to conformity to precedent); Charles R. Shipan, Acclimation Effects Revisited, 
40 Jurimetrics 243 (2000) (finding evidence of ideological instability in the merits voting of 
some but not most freshmen Justices on the Warren and Burger Courts); Sandra L. Wood, et al, 
“Acclimation Effects” for Supreme Court Justices: A Cross-Validation, 1888-1940, 42 Am J Pol 
Sci 690, 694 (1998) (finding “some evidence of an acclimation effect for at least some of the 
justices” with respect to ideological instability in merits voting); Brenner and Hagle, 18 Pol 
Behav 235 (cited in note 27) (finding freshman effect with respect to opinion output); Timothy 
M. Hagle, A New Test for the Freshman Effect, 21 Southeastern Pol Rev 289 (1993) (finding 
evidence of ideological instability in the merits voting of some freshman Justices on the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts);  Hagle, 37 Am J Pol Sci 1142 (cited in note 27) (finding evidence of 
ideological instability in the merits voting of some Justices joining the Court between 1953 and 
1989); S. Sidney Ulmer, Toward a Theory of Sub-Group Formation in the United States 
Supreme Court, 27 J Pol 133, 151 (1965) (finding some evidence of freshman effect in bloc 
voting for Justices joining the Court between 1946 and 1961).  
10 
 
either non-existent or confined to limited circumstances.29 Studies of the freshman period for 
individual Justices on the whole have not lent much support to the hypothesis.30 
                                                          
29 See, for example, Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II, and Forrest Maltzman, The Politics 
of Dissents and Concurrences on the US Supreme Court, 27 Am Pol Q 488, 503-04 (1999) 
(“Contrary to the freshman effect hypothesis, freshman justices are no less likely to join or 
author a concurring or dissenting opinion than their more senior colleagues”); Richard Pacelle 
and Patricia Pauly, The Freshman Effect Revisited: An Individual Analysis, 17 Am Rev Pol 1, 6, 
15 (1996) (finding no freshman effect with respect to ideological instability in merits votes in the 
aggregate, and “only limited evidence” of such an effect with respect to individual Justices 
joining the Court between 1945 and 1988); Terry Bowen, Consensual Norms and the Freshman 
Effect on the United States Supreme Court, 76 Soc Sci Q 222, 227 (1995) (finding no freshman 
effect for separate opinion writing on the Hughes and Taft Courts, but finding such a freshman 
effect during the 1941-1992 period); Terry Bowen and John M. Scheb, II, Freshman Opinion 
Writing on the US Supreme Court, 1921-1991, 76 Judicature 239 (1993) (finding no freshman 
effect with respect to opinion assignments); Robert L. Dudley, The Freshman Effect and Voting 
Alignments: A Reexamination of Judicial Folklore, 21 Am Polit Q 360 (1993) (finding no 
freshman effect with respect to bloc voting even when using Snyder’s data); Terry Bowen and 
John M. Scheb, II, Reassessing the “Freshman Effect”: The Voting Block Alignment of New 
Justices on the United States Supreme Court, 1921-90, 15 Pol Behav 1 (1983) (finding no 
freshman effect with respect to bloc voting); Heck and Hall, 43 J Pol 852 (cited in note 27) 
(finding very little evidence of a freshman effect in bloc voting on the Warren and Burger 
Courts); Slotnick, 41 J Pol 640 (cited in note 27) (finding no freshman effect with respect to 
opinion assignments). For efforts to explain the divergences in scholarly findings, see Hagle, 21 
Southeastern Pol Rev 289 (cited in note 28); Hagle, 37 Am J Pol Sci 1142 (cited in note 27); 
Albert P. Melone, Revisiting the Freshman Effect Hypothesis: The First Two Terms of Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, 74 Judicature 6, 13 (1990); Heck and Hall, 43 J Pol at 859-60 (cited in note 
27). 
30 See, for example, Thomas R. Hensley, Joyce A. Baugh, and Christopher E. Smith, The First-
Term Performance of Chief Justice John Roberts, 43 Idaho L Rev 625, 631 (2007) (finding no 
freshman effect with respect to bloc voting); Christopher E. Smith and S. Thomas Read, The 
Performance and Effectiveness of New Appointees to the Rehnquist Court, 20 Ohio N U L R 205 
(1993) (finding a freshman effect with respect to Justice Souter but not with respect to Justice 
Thomas); Arledge and Heck, 45 Western Pol Q 761 (cited in note 27) (finding no freshman 
effect); Melone, 74 Judicature 6 (cited in note 29) (finding a freshman effect only with respect to 
majority opinion assignments); Thea F. Rubin and Albert P. Melone, Justice Antonin Scalia: A 
First Year Freshman Effect?, 72 Judicature 98 (1988) (finding a freshman effect only with 
respect to majority opinion assignments); John M. Scheb, II and Lee W. Ailshie, Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor and the Freshman Effect, 69 Judicature 9 (1985) (finding evidence of a freshman 
effect only with respect to majority opinion assignments in her first Term); Edward V. Heck, The 
Socialization of a Freshman Justice: The Early Years of Justice Brennan, 10 Pac L J 707, 714-
16, 722-25 (1979) (finding little evidence of a freshman effect).  
11 
 
Professor Howard suggested that the freshman effect might also be manifested by a 
tendency of new Justices to change their votes between the conference vote and the final vote on 
the merits. Howard listed a number of considerations that might prompt of a Justice to shift 
ground in this manner, but first among them were “unstable attitudes that seem to have resulted 
from the process of assimilation to the Court.” For instance, he remarked, “Justice Cardozo, 
according to one clerk’s recollection of the docket books…frequently vot[ed] alone in 
conference before ultimately submerging himself in a group opinion.”31 Howard reported that 
Justice Murphy exhibited “a similar instability” during his freshman years on the Court.32 
Subsequent studies from the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Court docket books have produced 
divergent conclusions with respect to this reputed feature of the freshman effect.33 
                                                          
31 Howard Jr, 62 Am Pol Sci Rev at 45 (cited in note 24). The clerk to whom Howard referred 
was Paul Freund. See Paul Freund, A Tale of Two Terms, 26 Ohio St L J 225, 227 (1965) (“I was 
struck in the 1932 Term with the number of occasions on which what came down as unanimous 
opinions had been far from that at conference. I had access to the docket book which the Justice 
kept as a record of the conference vote -- these books are destroyed at the end of each term -- and 
I was enormously impressed with how many divisions there were that did not show up in the 
final vote. I was impressed with how often Justice Cardozo was in a minority, often of one, at 
conference, but did not press his position.”) 
32 Howard Jr, 62 Am Pol Sci Rev at 45 (cited in note 24).  
33 Compare Maltzman and Wahlbeck, 90 Am Pol Sci Rev at 589 (cited in note 4) (finding that 
“freshmen justices are significantly more likely to switch than are their more senior colleagues”), 
Saul Brenner, Another Look at Freshman Indecisiveness on the United States Supreme Court, 16 
Polity 320 (1983) (finding that between the 1946 and 1966 Terms freshman Justices exhibited on 
average greater fluidity between the conference vote and the final votes on the merits than did 
senior Justices, and that this fluidity tended to diminish between a Justice’s first and fourth terms 
on the Court), and Dorff and Brenner, 54 J Pol at 767, 769-71 (cited in note 4) (finding that 
freshman Justices were “more likely to be uncertain regarding how to vote at the original vote on 
the merits and more likely to be influenced by the decision of the majority at the final vote”) with 
Hagle and Spaeth, 44 Western Pol Q 119 (cited in note 4) (finding that the voting fluidity of 
freshman Justices on the Warren Court did not differ significantly from that of their more senior 
colleagues, and that the voting fluidity of such freshman Justices had not diminished by their 
third and fourth Terms on the Court). See also Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II, and 
Peter J. Wahlbeck, Passing and Strategic Voting on the US Supreme Court, 39 L & Society Rev 
349, 369 (2005) (finding that freshman Justices on the Burger Court did not pass more frequently 
than their senior colleagues). 
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A review of the voting behavior of newcomers to the Taft Court does not disclose any 
appreciable freshman effect with respect to voting fluidity. Instead, one finds that in the major 
cases examined here, those who were early in their judicial tenures were not more likely than 
were their senior colleagues to change their positions between the conference vote and the final 
vote on the merits. 
This article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly introduces the Taft Court Justices and their 
voting practices. Part II discusses the major Taft Court cases that were unanimous both at 
conference and in the published report of the decision. Part III examines cases that were not 
unanimous at conference but became unanimous by the time the Court announced its decision. 
Part IV analyzes the Court’s nonunanimous cases. Part V reports on the Taft Court’s opinion 
reassignment practices. Part VI concludes. 
I.  THE TAFT COURT JUSTICES AND THEIR VOTING PRACTICES 
Justice Stone was the last Justice to be appointed to the Taft Court, replacing Justice 
Joseph McKenna in 1925. The Court that he joined consisted of Chief Justice Taft, and Associate 
Justices Holmes, Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, George Sutherland, Butler, and Edward 
Terry Sanford. Because Justice Butler did not take his seat until January of 1923, we have no 
docket book records for cases decided during the 1921 Term, which was Taft’s first as Chief 
Justice. Also lacking are docket records for cases decided early in the 1922 Term, including 
some of considerable interest.34 
                                                          
34 These include Ozawa v United States, 260 US 178 (1922) (holding that a Japanese national 
born in Japan was not Caucasian and was therefore ineligible for naturalization); Yamashita v 
Hinkle, 260 US 199 (1922) (same); Heisler v Thomas Colliery Co, 260 US 245 (1922) 
(upholding that a state tax on coal to be shipped in interstate commerce against a dormant 
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Taft is famous for his “consuming ambition” to “mass the Court” – to build unanimity so 
as to give “weight and solidity” to its decisions.35 The Taft Court did achieve unanimity in a 
remarkable percentage of its cases. For the 1921-1928 Terms, 84 % of the Court’s published 
opinions were unanimous;36 taking into account all of its decisions for the entirety of Taft’s 
tenure, the unanimity rate was 91.4 %.37 Though this rate of unanimity was in line with the rates 
achieved by the White Court,38 certain characteristics of the Taft Court may have contributed to 
its maintenance. First, Taft discouraged dissents, believing that most of them were displays of 
egotism that weakened the Court’s prestige and contributed little of value.39 As a consequence, 
he worked hard to minimize disagreement, often sacrificing the expression of his own personal 
views.40 This is illustrated by a comparison of the percentage of cases accompanied by written 
opinions in which various Chief Justices have dissented over the course of the Court’s history. 
Taft dissented in only 0.93 % of such cases. By contrast, his predecessor, Edward White, 
dissented in 1.53 %; his successor, Charles Evans Hughes, did so in 2.24 %; and Harlan Fiske 
                                                          
Commerce Clause challenge); United States v Lanza, 260 US 377 (1922) (holding that 
prosecutions by both state and federal authorities for violations of their respective liquor laws did 
not violate the prohibition against Double Jeopardy); and Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 
US 393 (1922) (holding that a state law impairing an owner’s subsurface mining rights 
constituted a taking). 
35 Mason, William Howard Taft at 198 (cited in note 4); Mason, Taft to Warren at 57 (cited in 
note 4); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Chief Justice of the United States: Primus Inter Pares, 17 
J Pub L 20, 31-32 (1968). 
36 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1309 (cited in note 2). 
37 Lee Epstein, et al, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Developments 147, 
161 (1994).  
38 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1310 (cited in note 2). 
39 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1310-11, 1356 (cited in note 2); Mason, William Howard Taft at 198 
(cited in note 4); Mason, 17 J Pub L at 31-32 (cited in note 35); William Howard Taft to Harlan 
F. Stone, Jan 26, 1927, Box 76, Harlan F. Stone Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, quoted in Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy 47 (Chicago 1964); 
Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice at 174 (cited in note 21). 
40 2 Pringle at 1049 (cited in note 4) (Taft “shrank from all dissents, including his own”); Post, 
85 Minn L Rev at 1311-12 (cited in note 2). 
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Stone did so in 13.49 % of all such cases handed down during his Chief Justiceship. Indeed, of 
all of the Chief Justices to serve from John Marshall through Earl Warren, only Marshall could 
boast a dissenting percentage lower than Taft’s.41 Van Devanter shared Taft’s distaste for public 
displays of discord, and strongly lobbied his colleagues to suppress their dissenting views.42 
Butler similarly regarded dissents as exercises of “vanity” that “seldom aid us in the right 
development or statement of the law,” and instead “often do harm.”43 He therefore commonly 
“acquiesce[d] for the sake of harmony & the Court.”44 McReynolds, Sutherland, Sanford, and 
McKenna expressed similar views and suppressed dissenting opinions accordingly.45 Even the 
“great dissenters,” Holmes and Brandeis, believed that dissents should be aired sparingly, and 
often “shut up,” as Holmes liked to put it, when their views departed from those of their 
colleagues.46 
                                                          
41 S. Sidney Ulmer, Exploring the Dissent Patterns of the Chief Justices: John Marshall to 
Warren Burger, in Sheldon Gordon and Charles M. Lamb, eds, Judicial Conflict and Consensus: 
Behavioral Studies of American Appellate Courts 53 (1986). 
42 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1318, 1340, 1341, 1343 (cited in note 2). 
43 Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United 
States, England, and France 214-15 (Oxford 2d ed 1968); Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy 
at 52 (cited in note 39); Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1340 (cited in note 2). 
44 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1341-43 (cited in note 2). 
45 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1341-44 (cited in note 2); James C. McReynolds to Harlan F. Stone, 
Apr 2, 1930, Box 76, Harlan F. Stone Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, quoted 
in Corley, Steigerwalt, and Ward, 38 J Sup Ct Hist at 30 (cited in note 20); Murphy, Elements of 
Judicial Strategy at 52-53 (cited in note 39). 
46 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1341-42, 1344-46, 1349-51 (cited in note 2); Mason, Taft to Warren at 
58 (cited in note 4) (“For the sake of harmony staunch individualists such as Holmes, Brandeis, 
and Stone, though disagreeing, would sometimes go along with the majority”); Northern 
Securities Co v United States, 193 US 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes dissenting) (“I think it useless 
and undesirable, as a rule, to express dissent”); Alexander M. Bickel, ed, The Unpublished 
Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis 18 (Chicago 1957) (“‘Can’t always dissent,’ [Brandeis] 
said….‘I sometimes endorse an opinion with which I do not agree’”); Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, 
The Supreme Court: 1947, 35 Fortune 78, 211-12 (1947) (“In the time of Chief Justice Taft, even 
Holmes and Brandeis might vote against a decision in conference without writing a dissent, and 
sometimes without even formally registering their disagreement.”) 
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 A variety of factors may have contributed to this “norm of acquiescence.”47 First, the 
literature of the period illustrates among the bench and bar a widely-held aversion to dissents as 
excessively self-regarding, and as weakening the force of judicial decisions by unsettling the 
law.48 This conviction found expression in Canon 19 of the American Bar Association’s Canons 
of Judicial Ethics, which exhorted judges not to “yield to pride of opinion or value more highly 
his individual reputation than that of the court to which he should be loyal. Except in cases of 
conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be 
discouraged in courts of last resort.” Instead, “judges constituting a court of last resort” were 
admonished to “use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and the 
consequent influence of judicial decision.”49 It is worthy of note that Taft was the chair of the 
committee that drafted the Canons, and that Sutherland was a committee member before his 
appointment to the Court.50 Second, in the early years of the Taft Court, new Justices came to the 
Court who were more likely to vote with the majority than some of their predecessors had 
                                                          
47 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1344 (cited in note 2). See Mason, Taft to Warren at 58 (cited in note 
4) (“Sometimes as many as three Justices would reluctantly go along with the majority because 
no one of them felt strongly enough about the issue to raise his voice in protest. During the early 
years of Taft’s Chief Justiceship, it was not unusual for Justices to write on the back of circulated 
slip opinions: ‘I shall acquiesce in silence unless someone else dissents’; or ‘I do not agree, but 
shall submit.’”) 
48 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1344, 1348-49, 1354, 1356-57 (cited in note 2); Evan A. Evans, The 
Dissenting Opinion – Its Use and Abuse, 3 Mo L Rev 120, 123-26 (1938) (quoting various 
criticisms of dissents made by members of the bench and bar); Alex Simpson Jr, Dissenting 
Opinions, 71 U Pa L Rev 205, 205-06 (1923) (quoting various professional criticisms of 
dissenting opinions); William A. Bowen, Dissenting Opinions, 17 Green Bag 690, 693 (1905) 
(“the Dissenting Opinion is of all judicial mistakes the most injurious”). 
49 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 19 (1924), in Lisa L. Milord, The Development of the 
ABA Judicial Code 137 (ABA 1992). In 1972, the American Bar Association replaced the 
Canons with a Code of Judicial Conduct, which does not contain a provision similar to Canon 
19. Wahlbeck, Spriggs II, and Maltzman, 27 Am Pol Q at 508 n 1 (cited in note 29). 
50 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1284 n 55 (cited in note 2). 
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been.51 Third, there was an impulse among the Justices to show a united front in order to “fend 
off external attacks” from progressive Senators like Robert LaFollette and William Borah, who 
shared the American Federation of Labor’s dissatisfaction with some of the Court’s recent 
decisions, and proposed legislation that would have limited the Court’s power to review 
congressional legislation.52 Fourth, the norm of acquiescence promoted a collegiality and 
reciprocity among the Justices that smoothed over potential conflicts.53 And fifth, during this 
period nearly all of the Justices had only one clerk rather than the four that Justices typically 
have today, and most of the Justices wrote their own opinions.54 With such comparatively 
limited resources at their disposal, the cost of preparing a dissenting opinion was considerably 
higher.55 
                                                          
51 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1313 (cited in note 2). 
52 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1314-18 (cited in note 2). 
53 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1345 (cited in note 2). See also Caldeira and Zorn, 42 Am J Pol Sci at 
877 (cited in note 20); Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy at 61 (cited in note 39) (“A Justice 
who persistently refuses to accommodate his views to those of his colleagues may come to be 
regarded as an obstructionist. A Justice whose dissents become levers for legislative or 
administrative action reversing judicial policies may come to be regarded as disloyal to the 
bench. It is possible that either appraisal would curtail his influence with his associates.”) 
54 During this period, Justices were authorized to employ a law clerk and a secretary. Pierce 
Butler used each to perform the duties of a law clerk, and one of them, John Cotter, wrote first 
drafts of most of Butler’s opinions. The other Justices, however, tended to employ only one law 
clerk, and to do their own drafting. See Barry Cushman, The Clerks of the Four Horsemen, Part 
I, 39 J Sup Ct Hist 386 (2014); Barry Cushman, The Clerks of the Four Horsemen, Part II, 40 J 
Sup Ct Hist 55 (2015); Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life 465 (2009). Congress did 
not authorize the Justices to hire two law clerks until 1941, though most of them continued to 
employ only one clerk until 1946. See Artemus Ward and David L. Weiden, Sorcerer’s 
Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United States Supreme Court 36-37 (NYU 2006).  
55 See Bradley J. Best, Law Clerks, Support Personnel, and the Decline of Consensual Norms on 
the United States Supreme Court 1935-1995 214, 232 (LFB 2002) (finding “a positive, 
statistically significant relationship between the number of law clerks on the Court and the 
frequency of dissenting and concurring opinions”); Ley, Searles, and Clayton, 49 Tulsa L Rev at 
112-13, 121 (cited in note 23) (concluding that “the opportunity for cost-lowering effects of law 
clerks” is “significant to our understanding of the persistence of non-consensual norms”.) 
17 
 
In discussing the post-conference voting behaviors of the Taft Court Justices, I will be using 
several defined terms. I shall use the term acquiescence to denote instances in which a Justice 
who either dissented or passed at conference ultimately joined in the majority’s disposition.56 In 
other words, acquiescence denotes instances in which a Justice who was not with the majority at 
conference moved toward the majority. I will refer to movements from dissent at conference to 
the majority in the final vote on the merits57 as instances of strong acquiescence; I will refer to 
movements from a passing vote at conference to the majority in the final vote on the merits as 
instances of weak acquiescence.58 Of course, such movement might have occurred either because 
the Justice in question became persuaded that the majority was correct, or because, though 
remaining unpersuaded, he elected to go along with the majority for the sake of some other 
consideration such as collegiality or public perception.59 The information contained in the docket 
books does not enable us to discriminate between these two possibilities, and therefore I shall not 
attempt to do so here. I will use the term nonacquiescence to denote instances in which a Justice 
who dissented at conference remained steadfast in his opposition to the majority’s disposition. In 
cases of nonacquiescence, there was no post-conference change in the vote of the Justice in 
question. I will use the term quasi-acquiescence to denote a situation in which a Justice who was 
                                                          
56 This is also sometimes referred to as “conformity voting,” see, for example, Dorff and 
Brenner, 54 J Pol at 763 (cited in note 4), or “minority-majority voting,” see, for example, Saul 
Brenner and Robert H. Dorff, The Attitudinal Model and Fluidity Voting on the United States 
Supreme Court: A Theoretical Perspective, 4 J Theoretical Polit 195, 197 (1992). 
57 I borrow this term from Professor Saul Brenner, 22 Jurimetrics at 287 (cited in note 24). What 
he calls the “original vote on the merits” I refer to as the “conference vote.” 
58 These two terms are adapted from Brenner, 26 Am J Pol Sci at 388 (cited in note 4), and 
Brenner, 24 J Pol Sci at 527 (cited in note 4) (referring to such movements as “strong fluidity” 
and “weak fluidity,” respectively.) 
59 See, for example, Brenner and Dorff, 4 J Theoretical Pol at 200 (cited in note 56) (concluding 
that Justices acquiesce “for non-attitudinal reasons, including small-group reasons”); Howard Jr, 
62 Am Pol Sci Rev at 45 (cited in note 24) (same). 
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inclined in conference to oppose the majority’s disposition withheld his dissent and instead 
publicly concurred in the result with the written statement that he was doing so only because he 
felt bound by the authority of an earlier decision with which he disagreed. Finally, I will use the 
term defection to denote instances in which a Justice who was either member of the conference 
majority or passed at conference later dissented from the published opinion.60 In other words, 
defection denotes instances in which the Justice in question moved away from the majority. 
Again, I will refer to movements from the majority at conference to dissent in the final vote on 
the merits as instances of strong defection; I will refer to movements from a passing vote at 
conference to the majority in the final vote on the merits as instances of weak defection.61 
II.  UNANIMOUS CASES WITH NO VOTE CHANGES 
The docket books contain vote tallies for 1200 of the 1381 cases in which the Court 
published a full opinion during the 1922-1928 Terms. Eighty-six % of these 1200 cases, or 1028, 
were decided unanimously. In 58 % of these 1028 unanimous cases, the vote also was 
unanimous in conference. Put another way, the conference vote was unanimous in 50 % of the 
1200 cases for which we have conference records.62 A number of these were decisions of 
considerable and lasting import. For example, Massachusetts v Mellon and Frothingham v 
Mellon63 were unanimous 1923 decisions upholding the Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act of 
                                                          
60 This is also sometimes referred to as “counterconformity voting,” see, for example, Dorff and 
Brenner, Pol at 763 (cited in note 4), or “majority-minority voting,” see, for example, Brenner 
and Dorff, 4 J Theoretical Pol at 197 (cited in note 56). 
61 See, for example, Brenner and Dorff, 4 J Theoretical Pol at 197 (cited in note 56). There also 
are instances in which a docket book entry does not record a vote for a particular Justice. Often 
that was because the Justice was absent from the conference, and where that was the case, I do 
not treat that Justice as having engaged in any of the defined voting behaviors. 
62 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1332 (cited in note 2). 
63 262 US 447 (1923). 
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1921 against constitutional challenge and articulating the taxpayer standing doctrine. Under these 
decisions, the constitutionality of congressional appropriations from general revenue could not 
be challenged by taxpayers, nor could states challenge the constitutionality of cooperative federal 
grant-in-aid programs. These precedents later would immunize billions of dollars in New Deal 
federal relief and public works spending from constitutional attack.64 And the votes in 
conference were unanimous. Butler’s notes record the disposition as “Dismiss 24 OR 
[Massachusetts v Mellon] as suit v U.S. No int[erest]. Dismiss on no right to sue. Not hurt. 962 
[Frothingham v Mellon] Dismissed below. ‘Affirmed’ by all. No interest to sue.”65 
In Florida v Mellon,66 the Court unanimously upheld a provision of the federal estate tax 
granting a credit against the tax for inheritance taxes paid to a state. An attractive package of 
mild winters and no state inheritance taxes had induced a number of wealthy residents from 
northern states to relocate to the Sunshine State. The federal tax credit was designed to level the 
playing field so that there would be no estate tax advantage gained by moving from a state with 
an inheritance tax to a state without one. In either case, the total tax on the transmission of wealth 
at death would be the same. One predictable consequence of this would be that states with 
inheritance taxes would be less likely to repeal them, and states without such taxes might be 
more likely to enact them. This mechanism, of granting a credit against a federal tax for a 
                                                          
64 See Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law 184 (Holt 1967); Carl 
B. Swisher, American Constitutional Development 838-39 (Praeger 2d ed 1954); Joel F. Paschal, 
Mr. Justice Sutherland: A Man Against the State 212 (Princeton 1951); Edward S. Corwin, 
Twilight of the Supreme Court: A History of our Constitutional Theory 176 (Shoe String 1934).  
65 Butler OT 1922 Docket Book. Two other important Taft Court decisions concerning the 
separation of powers also were unanimous both at conference and in the announced judgment. 
See J.W. Hampton Jr and Co v United States, 276 US 394 (1928), a landmark in the 
development of the nondelegation doctrine, Stone OT 1927 Docket Book, and the Pocket Veto 
Case, 279 US 655 (1929), Stone OT 1928 Docket Book. 
66 273 US 12 (1927).  
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comparable tax paid to a state, would provide the blueprint for the unemployment compensation 
provisions of the Social Security Act. Those provisions were crafted with the guidance of Justice 
Brandeis, and with Florida v Mellon very much in mind.67 And the conference vote in that 
decision, like the conference vote in Frothingham, was unanimous.68 The docket books indicate 
that these two major building blocks of the modern welfare state met with no objection from the 
Justices of the Taft Court. 
Chas. Wolff Packing Co v Court of Industrial Relations of the State of Kansas,69 also 
decided in 1923, unanimously invalidated as violating the Due Process Clause a wage order 
issued pursuant to the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations Act’s statutory scheme of 
compulsory industrial arbitration. The vote again was unanimous at conference.70 The case 
                                                          
67 See, for example Joseph P. Lash, Dealers and Dreamers: A New Look at the New Deal 244- 
45 (Doubleday 1988); Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People 386-87 
(Harvard 1984);  Lewis J. Paper, Brandeis 354-57 (Prentice-Hall 1983); Bruce Allan Murphy, 
The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political Activities of Two Supreme Court 
Justices 165-77 (Oxford 1982); Melvin I. Urofsky, A Mind of One Piece: Brandeis and 
American Reform 131 (Scribner 1971); Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, 3 The Age of Roosevelt: The 
Politics of Upheaval 301-03, 305-06 (Houghton Mifflin 1960); David J. Danelski, The Propriety 
of Brandeis’ Extrajudicial Conduct, in Nelson L. Dawson, ed, Brandeis and America 11, 26-27 
(Kentucky 1989); Nelson L. Dawson, Brandeis and the New Deal, in Dawson, ed, Brandeis and 
America 38, 48; Thomas H. Eliot, The Advent of Social Security, in Katie Louchheim, ed, The 
Making of the New Deal 150, 159, 160-61 (Harvard 1983); Paul Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in 
Allison Dunham and Philip B. Kurland, eds, Mr. Justice 177, 190 (Chicago 1964); Melvin I. 
Urofsky and David W. Levy, eds, 5 Letters of Louis D. Brandeis 520, 523, 526-27 (State Univ 
NY 1978);  Franklin Roosevelt to Felix Frankfurter, June 11, 1934, in Max Freedman, annot, 
Roosevelt and Frankfurter: Their Correspondence, 1928-1945 at 122-23 (Atlantic Monthly 
1968); Tom Corcoran and Ben Cohen to Felix Frankfurter, June 18, 1934,  Freedman, annot, 
Roosevelt and Frankfurter 123-26; 79 Cong Rec 9287 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner); 
Steward Machine Co v Davis, 301 US 548, 557, 559 (1937) (oral argument of Charles 
Wyzanski); Steward Machine Co v Davis, 301 US at 562, 564 (oral argument of Assistant 
Attorney General Robert Jackson). 
68 Stone OT 1926 Docket Book. 
69 262 US 522 (1923). 
70 Butler OT 1922 Docket Book. 
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returned to the Court in 1925 under the same style, this time involving the constitutionality of an 
order concerning working hours. The Court again unanimously invalidated the order,71 and the 
vote in conference similarly was unanimous. In arguing for reversal of the lower court, Taft 
lamented that “our mandate” in the earlier decision was “not obeyed.” “The whole jud[gment] 
should go,” he argued. “Also,” he added, “that fixing of hours is bad here.” Butler records 
Holmes and Van Devanter as following with “Yes,” while McReynolds agreed that the “order is 
bad as to hours.”72 
Chastleton Corp. v Sinclair,73 which unanimously held that the post-War emergency that 
had justified residential rent control in the District of Columbia had ended, also was unanimous 
at conference. Butler’s notes indicate that Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler, 
Sanford, and perhaps Taft expressed the view that the “Act [is] bad.”74  Yeiser v Dysart,75 a 1925 
decision unanimously upholding regulation of the compensation of lawyers representing 
workmen’s compensation claimants in Nebraska courts, likewise was unanimous at conference. 
Butler’s notes record Taft as stating that the regulation was a “Reasonable provision. Law 
applies to a class,” and that a lawyer representing such a client was an “Officer of [the] Court.”76 
This reasoning was faithfully reflected in Holmes’ opinion.77 Weller v New York78 considered the 
constitutionality of a statute regulating theater ticket brokers. In 1927, a closely divided Court 
                                                          
71 Charles Wolff Packing Co v The Court of Industrial Relations of the State of Kansas, 267 US 
552 (1925). 
72 Butler OT 1924 Docket Book. 
73 264 US 543 (1924). 
74 Butler OT 1923 Docket Book. For more a bit more detail about the conference discussion, see 
Post, BU L Rev at 1497-98 (cited in note 3). 
75 267 US 540 (1925). 
76 Butler OT 1924 Docket Book. 
77 267 US 540 (1925). 
78 268 US 319 (1925). 
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would invalidate a provision of the statute limiting the price that such brokers could charge for 
resale tickets,79 but in Weller the Court unanimously upheld a section of the statute requiring that 
such brokers be licensed. The vote at conference also was unanimous.80 Butler records the Chief 
Justice as stating, “Within power to license brokers. Doubt as to price.” Holmes remarked, “Stat. 
good,” and Van Devanter added, “Good as to license.”81 In Asakura v Seattle,82 the Court 
unanimously held that a Seattle ordinance excluding non-citizens from the business of pawn 
brokerage violated the terms of a treaty with Japan guaranteeing the rights of each nation’s 
citizens or subjects to reside in the other in order “to carry on trade.” The vote at conference was 
unanimous, with Taft stating, “Treaty gives right to carry on Trade & Pawn-broking is ‘trade as 
old as business itself.’”83 
There also were several important dormant Commerce Clause cases in which the 
unanimity generated in conference held firm. This was true in Real Silk Hosiery Mills v 
Portland,84 which struck down an ordinance imposing a license tax on solicitors of orders to be 
filled by an out-of-state manufacturer;85 in Clark v Poor,86 which upheld a state requirement that 
common carriers obtain a permit and pay a tax to help maintain highways;87 and in Leonard & 
                                                          
79 Tyson and Bro v Banton, 273 US 418 (1927). 
80 Butler OT 1924 Docket Book; Stone OT 1924 Docket Book. 
81 Butler OT 1924 Docket Book. As was often the case, here Butler ceased recording the remarks 
of his colleagues after the first few had spoken. 
82 265 US 332 (1924). 
83 Butler OT 1923 Docket Book. 
84 268 US 325 (1925). 
85 Butler OT 1924 Docket Book; Stone OT 1924 Docket Book. Butler records Taft as presenting 
the case to the conference with the assertion that “The business is interstate commerce. The 
interference is direct.” 
86 274 US 554 (1927). 
87 Stone OT 1926 Docket Book. 
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Leonard v Earle,88 which upheld state licensure and regulation of oyster-packing 
establishments.89 Other significant economic regulation cases that were unanimous both at 
conference vote and at the final vote on the merits include Miller v Schoene,90 which upheld a 
state statute requiring destruction of cedar trees infected with disease;91 Tagg Bros. & Moorhead 
v United States,92 which upheld federal regulation of fees charged by commission salesmen 
working in major stockyards under the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921;93 and Roschen v 
Ward,94 which upheld a New York statute making it unlawful to sell eyeglasses at retail in any 
store unless a duly licensed physician or optometrist was in charge and in personal attendance.95 
Roschen would serve as the principal authority for the highly deferential 1955 decision in 
Williamson v Lee Optical Co, in which the Court rebuffed the due process and equal protection 
claims of Oklahoma opticians who objected to a state statute making it unlawful for anyone other 
than a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit lenses to a face, or to duplicate or replace 
lenses without a written prescription from a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist.96 
                                                          
88 279 US 392 (1929). 
89 Stone OT 1928 Docket Book. 
90 276 US 272 (1928). It appears, however, that Butler may have harbored reservations. On his 
return of Stone’s opinion he wrote, “I acquiesce.” Justice Butler, Return of Miller v. Schoene, 
Box 55, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
91 Stone OT 1927 Docket Book. McReynolds was absent from the conference. 
92 280 US 420 (1930). 
93 Stone OT 1929 Docket Book. 
94 279 US 337 (1929). 
95 Stone OT 1928 Docket Book. Sutherland was absent from the conference. 
96 348 US 483 (1955). Other regulatory cases that were unanimous both at the conference vote 
and at the final vote on the merits include Sprout v City of South Bend, 277 US 163 (1928) 
(invalidating city license tax for commercial carrier conducting an interstate business), Stone OT 
1927 Docket Book; Hygrade Provision Co v Sherman, 266 US 497 (1925) (upholding against a 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge a state law imposing criminal penalties on companies 
misrepresenting foods as Kosher), Butler OT 1924 Docket Book, Stone OT 1924 Docket Book; 
and The New England Divisions Case, 261 US 184 (1923) (expansively reading the Interstate 
Commerce Commission’s power to set rates), Butler OT 1922 Docket Book. United States v 
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A number of high-profile civil rights and civil liberties decisions also were unanimous 
from wire to wire. Pierce v Society of Sisters,97 which unanimously invalidated an Oregon 
measure requiring children in the state to attend public schools, also was unanimous at 
conference.98 Taft stated that the “Act deprives parents and children of liberty under the 14th 
Am.” The Chief “Quoted Meyer v Nebraska,” which two years earlier had invalidated a 
Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of any modern foreign language to children in the 
eighth grade or younger. Butler records that Taft “Couples” this precedent “with ‘religious 
liberty’ of par. & child – public schools cannot [illegible] it.”99 The Chief also cited to “Adams v 
Tanner, 244 U.S.”,100 a 1917 decision invalidating a law prohibiting the receipt of fees by 
employment agents, which suggests that he was thinking of the case not only in as a protection of 
religious liberty, but also in terms of the occupational liberty of the instructors. Taft also invoked 
“Harlan’s diss. Berea College 211,”101 which intimates that he also considered the statute an 
infringement of what Justice John Marshall Harlan I there had described in dissent as the 
constitutionally protected “right to impart and receive instruction not harmful to the public.”102 
Holmes next indicated that he “Agrees,” while adding that “As an original prop[osition] might be 
troublesome without Meyer,”103 from which he had dissented two years earlier.104 Two years 
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after Pierce, in Farrington v Tokushige, where the Court extended the benefits of the right 
recognized in Meyer to aliens in Hawaii attending schools in which the primary language of 
instruction was Japanese, the vote was unanimous at the conference as well as in the published 
opinion.105 
The same voting pattern occasionally occurred in cases involving criminal law and 
procedure. In Linder v United States,106 for example, the Court unanimously reversed the 
conviction of a physician under the Harrison Narcotic Act by construing the statute not to apply 
to his conduct. The vote was unanimous,107 with Brandeis and Sutherland voting to “Reverse,” 
and Holmes stating “Rev if possible.”108 Van Devanter, who had voted to declare the statute 
unconstitutional in 1919,109 asserted that the “Act [is] bad – but consistently with former 
decisions [the conviction] can be reversed.”110 McReynolds, who preserved a running 
constitutional objection to the statute,111 remarked, “Reverse – Would reverse the whole line.” 
Interestingly, Taft, who spoke first, is recorded as stating, “Reviewed decisions and concluded 
‘affirm.’” But the Chief also voted last, and when the time came to cast his ballot, he joined his 
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colleagues in voting to reverse.112 In United States v Daugherty113 the Justices unanimously 
criticized a fifteen year sentence for three separate sales of cocaine as “extremely harsh” and 
unjustified by the circumstances disclosed in the record, and remanded the case for 
reconsideration of the appropriate punishment.114 And in Tumey v Ohio115 the Court invalidated 
as a denial of due process a scheme of compensation for certain judicial officers under which the 
officer received payment for his services only if the defendant were convicted.116 
Of course, not all civil rights and civil liberties decisions that were unanimous both at the 
conference vote and at the final vote on the merits favored those who claimed that their rights 
had been infringed. This is illustrated by a series of cases arising in connection with enforcement 
of the prohibition laws. In Dumbra v United States,117 the Court upheld a warrant to search 
premises for liquor as based upon probable cause.118 In Steele v United States,119 the Justices 
held that the description in a search warrant was sufficiently definite to satisfy constitutional and 
statutory requirements.120 Marron v United States121 upheld the seizure of account books and 
papers used in conducting a criminal enterprise during a search incident to a lawful arrest.122 
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Hebert v Louisiana123 held that conduct violating both state and federal prohibition laws could be 
prosecuted by both state and federal authorities without violating the prohibition on Double 
Jeopardy.124 And in Van Oster v Kansas,125 the Court upheld a state forfeiture law as applied to 
property used in the violation of state liquor laws.126 
Such mixed results can be seen as well in a broader array of civil rights and civil liberties 
decisions that were unanimous both at the conference vote and at the final vote on the merits. 
Though Nixon v Herndon127 invalidated the Texas Democratic Party’s “white primary,”128 Gong 
Lum v Rice129 upheld Mississippi’s system of segregated education.130 While Ex parte 
Grossman131 upheld presidential commutation of a criminal contempt sentence imposed by a 
federal judge,132 and Hammershmidt v United States133 rejected a government attempt to 
characterize attempts to obstruct the draft as a criminal conspiracy to defraud the United 
States,134 Cockrill v California135 affirmed a conviction under California’s Alien Land Law.136 
And just as Cheung Sum Shee v Nagle137 overturned the Secretary of Labor’s refusal to admit the 
alien wives and minor children of resident Chinese merchants lawfully domiciled in the United 
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States,138 so United States v Thind139 held that a native of India was ineligible for 
naturalization.140 Notwithstanding their seemingly variable policy valences, the norm of 
acquiescence was not in play in any of these cases. All of these were dispositions to which each 
of the Justices agreed from the outset. 
III.  UNANIMOUS CASES WITH VOTE CHANGES 
Of the 1028 unanimous 1922-1928 Term decisions for which we have conference 
records, in 30 % unanimity would not have been achieved had a conference dissenter not 
changed his vote to join the majority. In another 12 %, unanimity would not have been attained 
had not a Justice who had expressed “uncertainty” at conference overcome his doubts.141 In other 
words, 42 % of the Taft Court’s unanimous decisions for this period were not unanimous at 
conference. In these cases, the ultimate unanimity of the Court obscured differences that had 
emerged at conference. Consider, for example, Radice v New York,142 which involved a 
challenge to a New York statute that prohibited the employment of women in restaurants 
between the hours of 10 P.M. and 6 A.M. The statute applied only to the state’s larger cities, 
however, and it contained exemptions for singers and performers, for attendants in ladies’ cloak 
rooms and parlors, and for those employed in hotel dining rooms and kitchens, or in lunch rooms 
or restaurants conducted by employers solely for the benefit of their employees. Sutherland’s 
unanimous opinion upholding the statute as a legitimate measure for the protection of health 
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dispelled any concern that the recent decision of Adkins v Children’s Hospital143 invalidating a 
minimum wage law for women had implicitly overruled the 1908 decision in Muller v Oregon144 
upholding a maximum working hours law for women.  The Justices also were unanimous in their 
rejection of the contention that the limitation of the statute to larger cities and the exemptions for 
particular types of employment worked a denial of equal protection. 
Felix Frankfurter later memorialized a conversation that he had with Brandeis about 
Radice, which he recounts as follows: 
July 6, 1924. I have said that I was certain that Ct would decide NY statute prohibiting 
night work by women favorably as it did (Radice v New York, 264 U.S.). L.D.B. took me 
aside and said “you might have been certain but it was not at all certain. That was one of 
those 5 to 4 that was teetering back & forth for some time. The man who finally wrote -- 
Sutherland was the fifth man & he had doubts & after a good deal of study (for whatever 
you may say of him he has character & conscience) came out for the act & then wrote his 
opinion. That swung the others around to silence. It was deemed inadvisable to express 
dissent and add another 5 to 4. The doubt as to the statute turned on unequal protection, 
which now looms up even more menacingly than due process, because the statute omitted 
some night work & only included some.”145 
 Butler’s record of the Radice conference confirms this account in most respects. The vote 
was 5-4, with McKenna, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler voting to invalidate the statute, 
though Butler records McReynolds’s dissenting vote as cast “Doubtfully.” It also appears that it 
was the equal protection issue that divided the Justices, and that Sutherland was decisive in 
forming the majority to uphold the statute. Butler records Sutherland as stating, “Classification 
can be sustained.”146 It also is clear that the four conference dissenters ultimately acquiesced in 
the judgment of their colleagues in the majority. It is not clear, however, whether the outcome 
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was “teetering back & forth for some time.” The case was argued January 17th and 18th,147 and 
the conference at which Sutherland cast the deciding vote and defended the classification was 
held on January 26.148 If there was any subsequent vacillation, Butler’s docket book does not 
record it. 
 In Brooks v United States,149 the Court unanimously upheld the Dyer Act of 1919, which 
made it a federal crime to transport or cause to be transported in interstate commerce “a motor 
vehicle, knowing the same to be stolen.” Seven years earlier, in Hammer v Dagenhart,150 the 
Justices had struck down the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act,151 which forbade the interstate 
shipment of goods produced by firms employing children. The Court there had held that, unlike 
such predecessor statutes as the Lottery Act,152 which prohibited interstate shipment of lottery 
tickets, and the Pure Food and Drugs Act,153 which prohibited interstate shipment of adulterated 
or mislabeled food and drugs, the Keating-Owen Act was not properly a regulation of interstate 
commerce because the goods whose interstate shipment it prohibited were “of themselves 
harmless.”154 Yet as a number of commentators have observed, Taft’s opinion for the Court did 
not explain how there was anything in particular about cars that had been stolen that made them 
“of themselves” harmful.155 
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A private memorandum located in Taft’s papers at the Library of Congress reveals that 
the Chief Justice himself struggled to distinguish the Dyer Act from the Keating-Owen Act. Taft 
understood the relevant line of cases to stand for the proposition that “[i]f the result of interstate 
transportation will be to spread some harmful matter or product, Congress may interfere without 
violating the Tenth Amendment. The facilities of interstate commerce may be withdrawn from 
those who are using it to corrupt others physically or morally.” If, on the other hand, “the 
transportation is being used to transport something harmless in itself and not calculated to spread 
evil, like cotton cloth,” Taft wrote, “Congress may not prohibit its interstate transportation, 
although its inception may have been in some evil which is the legitimate object of the police 
power, such as child labor.” Earlier decisions could be distinguished from Hammer on this basis. 
The Chief Justice noted that “the interstate carriage of lottery tickets will communicate the 
gambling fever, of obscene literature will communicate moral degeneracy, of impure food will 
endanger health, [and] of diseased cattle will infect local cattle. . . .” In each of these instances, 
interstate transportation of the item inflicted a harm outside the state of origin. The 
“justification” for the doctrine, Taft concluded, “must be that Congress can prohibit the interstate 
spread of an evil thing, although it cannot prohibit the spread of something harmless in itself in 
order to suppress an evil which is properly the object of state police regulation.”156 
Taft was persuaded that this reasoning sufficed to sustain the constitutionality of the Dyer 
Act, but he conceded that this conclusion might not be obvious. “At first I had a little difficulty 
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with stolen automobiles,” he confessed, “as the chief evil in connection therewith is the stealing 
and that of course is over before the machine takes on its character as a stolen automobile. This 
makes it look something like Hammer v Dagenhart.” But the Chief Justice reassured himself 
with the observation that “a stolen automobile is a canker. It attracts shady and disreputable 
individuals and leads to secret and underhanded dealings. Certainly it is not ultra vires for 
Congress to prohibit the interstate communication of this canker.”157 
Taft apparently wrote this memorandum before the conference on Brooks that was held 
on January 31, 1925, because his presentation to his colleagues affirmed his belief in the Act’s 
constitutionality. Butler summarized Taft’s remarks as, “Thinks first section good. Distinguishes 
bet Caminetti & Dagenhart Case.”158 Holmes expressed the view that the defendant’s 
constitutional claim was “not meritorious” and that the case presented “No substantial Const. 
qu[estion].”159 Van Devanter also is recorded as taking the position that both the statute and the 
indictment were “good.”160  
Sutherland had been a United States Senator when the Pure Food and Drugs Act was 
passed, and had voted in favor of its passage.161 He also was in the Senate in 1910 when that 
body approved by a voice vote the Mann Act,162 which prohibited the interstate transportation of 
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women and girls for immoral purposes.163 And he still occupied a seat in the upper chamber in 
1913 when Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act,164 which prohibited the interstate 
transportation of liquor into states where it was intended to be received, possessed, or sold in 
violation of state law. Here Sutherland had voted against165 and offered the principal 
constitutional argument in opposition to the bill.166 Sutherland maintained that Congress did not 
have the power to prohibit the interstate shipment of liquor unless and until it had become 
“outlawed by the common opinion of the people.”167 Until such time as that occurred, Sutherland 
insisted, alcohol was “a legitimate article of commerce, and so long as it is recognized as such it 
cannot be denied the right of interstate transportation.”168 
The Court unanimously upheld the Pure Food and Drugs Act in Hipolite Egg. Co v 
United States,169 and the Justices sustained the Mann Act in Hoke v United States170 and 
Caminetti. In 1917 the Court upheld the Webb-Kenyon Act as a legitimate exercise of the 
commerce power, with Chief Justice Edward Douglass White writing that because of alcohol’s 
“exceptional nature,” it would be within congressional power to exclude it from interstate 
commerce altogether.171 But despite these precedents, Sutherland was plagued by the very sorts 
of doubts about the Dyer Act that had troubled Taft. Butler records him as objecting that 
“Automobiles [are] not like liquor – [or] Bad food – [or] girls [transported for] immoral purposes 
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– Transported as a [illegible] part.” Both Sutherland and McReynolds apparently were not 
persuaded that stolen automobiles were “in themselves harmful,” and when it came time to vote 
each of them registered their dissent.172 But here again these Justices observed the Taft Court 
norm of acquiescence, and joined with their colleagues to make a unanimous Court. 
 Oliver Iron Mining Co v Lord173 was an important decision in the line of Commerce 
Clause authority distinguishing production from commerce.174 There the Justices upheld a state 
occupation tax on coal mining, even though the coal extracted was to be shipped to points 
outside the state to satisfy existing contracts. “Mining,” wrote Van Devanter for a unanimous 
Court, “is not interstate commerce, but, like manufacturing, is a local business subject to local 
regulation and taxation. . . . Its character in this regard is intrinsic, is not affected by the intended 
use or disposal of the product, is not controlled by contractual engagements, and persists even 
though the business be conducted in close connection with interstate commerce.” In this case, he 
noted, “[t]he ore does not enter interstate commerce until after the mining is done.” It was true 
that “[t]he tax may indirectly and incidentally affect such commerce,” but this, he concluded, 
was “not a forbidden burden or interference.”175 
Only seven Justices participated in the conference vote taken on January 6, 1923. Justice 
Mahlon Pitney had retired a week earlier,176 and Sanford had not yet been nominated to replace 
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him.177 Butler was not confirmed until December 21, 1922,178 two weeks after the arguments had 
taken place on December 6 and 7,179 and so did not participate at the conference. Butler records 
the conference vote as 4-3 to reverse the District Court, with Taft, McKenna, Van Devanter, and 
McReynolds opposed by Holmes, Brandeis, and Sutherland.180 Ultimately, however, the Court 
was unanimous to affirm – the Justices in the conference majority were persuaded to join with 
the minority Justices in massing the Court. The decision was not handed down until May 7, 
months after Sanford’s confirmation, and the published report contains no indication that Butler 
and Sanford did not participate. This suggests the possibility that another vote was held with a 
full Court, that the two new Justices agreed with the conference minority, and that the four 
Justices now in the minority then acquiesced in the decision. 
Coronado Coal Co v United Mine Workers of America181  involved a strike called by a 
local affiliate of the United Mine Workers (UMW) against Arkansas coal producers in which the 
strikers had deliberately destroyed company mines and equipment. The case involved two 
questions. The first was whether, under the circumstances, the UMW could be held liable for the 
property damage inflicted by members of the local union. The trial court had directed a verdict in 
favor of the UMW on this issue, and the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed this judgment. 
The second issue was whether the actions of the local union might constitute a conspiracy in 
restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The trial court also had directed a verdict in 
favor of the local union on this question, but here the Court unanimously reversed the judgment 
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and remanded for a new trial. The Justices ruled that there was substantial evidence that the 
actions of the local union were undertaken with the intent to prevent interstate shipment of coal 
that would compete with union coal in neighboring states.182 
 This was precisely the position that Taft had taken at conference, and he was joined in 
that view by Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler. Butler records that Taft stated, “Af’[firm] as 
[to] United M.W. [and] Rev[erse] as to Local 21. I.C.C. [Interstate Commerce Clause] point for 
jury.” Van Devanter is recorded “Same as 1[Taft],” and both Sutherland and Butler are recorded 
as “With 1.” Holmes stated that he “Would affirm” as to both issues, and Brandeis is noted as 
agreeing with “O.W.H.” McReynolds indicated that he “Would reverse all.” There is no 
indication of any comment from Sanford or Stone. McReynolds apparently acquiesced at the 
conference: When the vote was taken, the count was 6-2 in favor of the disposition advocated by 
the Chief Justice, with Holmes and Brandeis dissenting, and no vote recorded for Stone. As 
Butler noted, “Brandeis and Holmes [voted] to affirm all.” But between the time of the 
conference and the delivery of the Court’s opinion, these two Justices (and possibly Stone) 
acquiesced in the disposition favored by the majority.183 
In National Assn. of Window Glass Manufacturers v United States,184 the Court 
unanimously rejected a Sherman Act challenge to an agreement between union glass blowers and 
an association of window glass manufacturers to fix wages and seasonally rotate the labor force 
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between two sets of factories. At the November 24, 1923 conference, however, Taft, McKenna, 
and McReynolds had dissented from the judgments of their colleagues.185 In Industrial 
Association of San Francisco v United States,186 the Court unanimously rejected the Sherman 
Act prosecution of building contractors who had agreed to maintain open shop employment 
policies by permitting sales of specified materials only to contractors maintaining an open shop. 
The price of that unanimity was Taft’s suppression of the dissent that he had registered at 
conference.187 Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Co v United States188 unanimously upheld the 
recapture provisions of the Transportation Act of 1920, but only because McKenna suppressed 
the dissenting vote that he had cast at conference.189 Panama Railroad v Johnson190 unanimously 
upheld provisions of the Jones Act authorizing injured seamen to sue their employers for 
damages, but only because McReynolds suppressed his dissenting conference vote.191 And 
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though the subject of intergovernmental tax immunities would become one of the most divisive 
confronting the Taft and Hughes Courts,192 in the 1926 case of Metcalf & Eddy v Mitchell193 the 
Justices unanimously upheld the imposition of the federal income tax on the profits of a private 
contractor from performance of contracts with state governments. In a gesture that would be in 
short supply in such cases in the future, Sutherland abandoned his dissenting conference stance 
and acquiesced to make a unanimous Court.194 On his return of Stone’s circulated draft opinion, 
Sutherland wrote, “I felt rather strongly the other way, but I shall yield. You have written a good 
opinion, and if we are to draw what seems to me to be a rather arbitrary line, perhaps this is as 
good as any.”195 
Similarly, the result in Trusler v Crooks,196 which unanimously invalidated as a “penalty” 
a tax imposed on options contracts in grain by the Futures Trading Act, did not receive the 
support of Van Devanter and Sutherland at conference.197 In Michigan Pub. Util. Comm’n v 
Duke,198 the Court unanimously condemned the state’s attempt “to convert property used 
exclusively in the business of a private carrier into a public utility, or to make the owner a public 
carrier” as a deprivation of property without due process. At the conference, however, Holmes 
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had passed.199 Also divided at conference were two important land use cases. The decision in 
Nectow v City of Cambridge,200 which unanimously invalidated a zoning ordinance as applied, 
received the support of only six Justices at conference. Brandeis dissented, and Holmes and 
Stone passed.201 That same year, in Washington v Roberge,202 the Court unanimously invalidated 
as repugnant to the Due Process Clause a zoning ordinance conditioning permission to construct 
a home for the aged poor on the written consent of the owners of two-thirds of the property 
within 400 feet of the proposed building. In conference, however, that disposition had garnered 
only five votes. McReynolds, Sutherland, and Sanford had dissented, and Stone had passed.203 
Some significant civil rights and civil liberties decisions also followed this pattern. In 
Whitney v California,204 the Justices unanimously affirmed the criminal syndicalism conviction 
of Anita Whitney, the niece of former Justice Stephen J. Field. Brandeis wrote a celebrated 
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concurring opinion, joined by Holmes, in which the two Justices voted to affirm the conviction 
on the grounds that, at trial, Ms. Whitney had neither contended that the California statute as 
applied to her was void because there was no clear and present danger of a serious evil, nor 
requested that the question of the existence of such conditions be passed upon by the court or a 
jury. Because there was other evidence tending to establish a conspiracy to commit present 
serious crimes, Brandeis and Holmes believed that the Court was without power to disturb to 
judgment of the state court.205 
Stone’s record of the conference in the spring of the 1926 Term contains only an 
indication that the opinion was assigned to Sanford.206 The case was initially argued at the 
beginning of the 1925 Term,207 however, and Stone’s docket book from that Term provides some 
insight into events at the initial conference. Stone’s notes indicate that the Justices unanimously 
voted to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.208 The difficulty, as Sanford later explained in 
his opinion for the Court, was that the record contained no indication that Whitney had raised nor 
that the state courts had considered or decided any federal question. The lower court later entered 
an order certifying that it had in fact passed upon the question of whether the statute violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that order subsequently was added to the record. With this addition, 
the Court concluded that it did have jurisdiction of the appeal, and returned the case to the docket 
for reargument in March of 1926.209 
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There is an ambiguity in Stone’s 1925 Term entry that is worth lingering over. Stone also 
records a vote on the merits in Whitney, though it is unclear whether this vote took place before 
or after reargument. That vote was 7-1 to affirm the conviction, with Brandeis dissenting, and a 
question mark placed in the “Reverse” column for Holmes.210 There is, however, another vote 
recorded, with “re-hearing” handwritten into the subject matter column above the vote tally. It is 
not clear whether this was a vote to grant reargument, or a vote on the merits following 
reargument. Stone lists the vote as 5-3, with Holmes, Brandeis, and Sanford voting in the 
negative column.211 It may be that these three Justices simply saw no point in reviewing a 
conviction that the previous vote gave them good reason to believe would be affirmed. But if this 
last vote was taken on the merits after reargument, Sanford’s vote to reverse would be 
remarkable for at least two reasons. First, he was the author of the 1925 decision Gitlow v New 
York,212 which upheld Benjamin Gitlow’s conviction under New York’s Criminal Anarchy 
statute for the publication of his “Left Wing Manifesto” in The Revolutionary Age newspaper. 
Brandeis there had joined Holmes’s celebrated dissent, in which he maintained that Gitlow’s 
“redundant discourse” presented no clear and present danger of an attempt to overthrow the 
government.213 Second, Sanford ultimately wrote the majority opinion in Whitney, and it is with 
much of the First Amendment theory contained in that opinion that Brandeis implicitly took 
issue in his famous concurring opinion. Based on Sanford’s opinions in Gitlow and Whitney, it 
                                                          
210 Stone OT 1925 Docket Book. Stone records McReynolds as voting with the majority on this 
issue. 
211 Stone OT 1925 Book. McReynolds is again listed as absent. 
212 268 US 652 (1925). Unfortunately, we do not have a docket book account of the conference 
in Gitlow. The case was reargued on Nov 23, 1923, but Butler’s docket books for the 1923 and 
1924 Terms have no entries for the case. Butler’s OT 1922 Docket Book lists Gitlow in the 
index, but contains no entry for the case. Stone OT 1924 Docket Book also contains no entry for 
the case.  
213 268 US at 672 (Holmes dissenting). 
42 
 
does not seem likely that the 5-3 vote was on the merits. If it was, however, then Sanford may 
have performed the ultimate act of acquiescence, not only joining in a judgment from which he 
had dissented at conference, but also shouldering the responsibility for writing the opinion 
supporting that judgment. In any event, Holmes and Brandeis also ultimately acquiesced in the 
majority’s disposition and, to a limited extent, its rationale. For many years, scholars have 
questioned why Brandeis did not dissent in Whitney.214 Stone’s record of the conference votes on 
the case shows that Brandeis voted to do so at least once, and perhaps twice. 
In Fiske v Kansas,215 decided the same day as Whitney, the Justices reversed the criminal 
syndicalism conviction of an organizer for the Industrial Workers of the World. Here again the 
judgment was unanimous, and this time there were no concurring opinions. At the conference, 
however, McReynolds had voted to affirm, and Stone placed question marks next to his own and 
Sutherland’s votes to reverse.216 In Corrigan v Buckley,217 a unanimous bench held that the 
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal in a challenge to the constitutionality of racially 
restrictive real estate covenants, because the case presented no substantial federal question. At 
the conference, by contrast, Van Devanter, Brandeis, and Butler had voted against dismissal.218 
And in Yu Cong Eng v Trinidad,219 the Court unanimously invalidated a law of the Philippine 
Islands prohibiting merchants from keeping account books in any other than one of three 
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approved languages. At the conference, however, this disposition had been opposed by Holmes 
and McReynolds.220 
The same pattern can be observed in several cases involving criminal law and criminal 
procedure. In Agnello v United States,221 the Court unanimously reversed a federal conviction for 
conspiracy to sell cocaine on the ground that the trial court had admitted evidence gathered 
during a warrantless search of the defendant’s residence. At the conference, however, Taft and 
Holmes had not been prepared to join the majority.222 In Fasulo v United States223 the Justices 
unanimously held that that a scheme for obtaining money by means of intimidation through 
threats of murder and bodily harm was not a “scheme to defraud” within the meaning of a federal 
statute  punishing the use of the mails for the purpose of executing any “scheme or artifice to 
defraud.” The vote at conference was 7-1, with Taft dissenting and McReynolds passing, but 
each of them ultimately acquiesced in the majority’s decision.224 In United States v Lee,225 the 
Court unanimously upheld the seizure and search incident to arrest by the Coast Guard of a 
vessel on the high seas, but only because Butler suppressed his dissenting conference vote.226 In 
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Gambino v United States227 the Court unanimously held that the Fourth Amendment barred 
introduction at federal trial of evidence seized by New York state police from the accused’s 
automobile without a warrant and without probable cause, and then turned over to federal 
authorities for prosecution. At the October 22, 1927 conference, there were only two votes for 
this disposition. Butler and Stone were in the minority, while McReynolds passed and Sutherland 
was absent. Moreover, Stone’s vote to reverse the conviction was uncertain: he placed a question 
mark next to his own vote. When the Justices again met to discuss the case on December 10, 
however, they unanimously approved Brandeis’ opinion for the Court reversing the conviction. 
The five members of the conference majority had changed their minds, and McReynolds and 
Sutherland joined the new majority.228 
Similarly, in Byars v United States229 the Court unanimously overturned a federal 
conviction secured on the basis of evidence discovered during a search underwritten by a 
defective state warrant. At conference, Taft, Holmes, and McReynolds had voted to affirm the 
conviction, but they ultimately acceded to the disposition favored by their brethren.230 Ziang 
Sung Wan v United States231 unanimously reversed a federal murder conviction obtained on the 
basis of a confession elicited under coercive circumstances. At the conference, however, 
McKenna, Van Devanter, and Sutherland had voted to affirm, and McReynolds passed.232 Here 
the returns of Brandeis’s draft opinion explicitly employed the language of acquiescence.  
McReynolds wrote, “I shall not oppose”; Van Devanter responded with “I shall assent”: and 
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Sutherland replied, “This is well done. I voted the other way but probably shall acquiesce.”233 
Cooke v United States,234 which involved charges of contempt of court committed by a lawyer 
outside the courtroom, followed a similar pattern. The Court unanimously upheld the alleged 
contemnor’s rights to be advised of the charges against him, and to be afforded the opportunity 
to defend or explain his actions, with the assistance of counsel if he so desired. But the decision 
was unanimous only because McReynolds again swallowed the objections that he had registered 
at conference.235 And in McGrain v Daugherty,236 a unanimous bench held that Congress has the 
power to subpoena witnesses and compel testimony. At the conference vote, however, Brandeis 
had dissented from this consensus.237 
IV.  NONUNANIMOUS CASES 
There were a number of major Taft Court decisions in which unanimity was not 
achieved. In some of these cases there was no notable movement – neither the votes of the 
Justices nor, to the extent recorded, the rationale of the decision changed between the conference 
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and the published opinion.238 This was true in both Meyer v Nebraska239 and Olmstead v United 
States, in which a sharply divided Court upheld warrantless wiretapping.240 It also was true in 
Myers v United States, a landmark decision on the scope of the President’s removal power,241 
and in the four Alien Land Law Cases of 1923, in which the majority affirmed judgments 
upholding the statutes while McReynolds and Brandeis maintained that there was “no 
jurisdiction” and voted to reverse.242 
This was also the case in Adkins v Children’s Hospital, which invalidated the District of 
Columbia’s minimum wage law for women by a vote of 5-3.243 In the four years following the 
decision in Adkins, the Court would twice invalidate state minimum wage statutes on the 
authority of that precedent. In the 1925 decision of Murphy v Sardell,244 the Court per curiam 
affirmed the judgment of the District Court striking down the Arizona statute “upon the authority 
of Adkins v Children's Hospital.” The brief report of the case continued, “Mr. Justice Holmes 
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requests that it be stated that his concurrence is solely upon the ground that he regards himself 
bound by the decision in Adkins v Children's Hospital. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissents.”245 In the 
1927 case of Donham v West-Nelson Co,246 the Court, again per curiam, affirmed the judgment 
of the District Court declaring the Arkansas statute unconstitutional “on the authority of Adkins v 
Children’s Hospital.” Brandeis again noted his dissent, though this time Holmes silently joined 
the majority.247  
The conference vote in Donham was 7-1, with Brandeis dissenting and Sanford not 
voting, though Stone has an erased vote to affirm in the Brandeis column.248 Two years earlier, 
in Murphy, the conference vote had been 8-1, with Brandeis noting a lone dissent, though here 
again Stone at one point marked Brandeis with the majority and then erased his vote to affirm. 
Stone’s notes on Murphy differ from his record of Donham in one important respect, however. 
Next to the votes to affirm of Taft, Holmes, and Sanford – the three dissenters in Adkins 
(Brandeis had not participated) – Stone wrote “on authority [illegible] [illegible].” Stone also 
wrote this next to his own vote to affirm. The illegibility of the latter two words in Stone’s 
notation makes it difficult to be certain, but it seems very likely that these four Justices indicated 
at the conference that they were voting to invalidate the statute only because they regarded 
themselves as bound by the recent authority of Adkins. If that is the case, then after McKenna’s 
replacement by Stone in 1925, there was a majority of the Court that believed that Adkins had 
been wrongly decided. Four of those five Justices continued to strike down state minimum wage 
laws solely on the basis of a precedent that they believed was demonstrably erroneous. This no 
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doubt frustrated Brandeis, whose solo dissents from these per curiam decisions might be read as 
opposing not only their results, but also the fealty to stare decisis that he soon would criticize in 
his celebrated dissent in Burnet v Coronado Oil & Gas Co.249 
A similar pattern of post-conference vote stability obtained in a series of lesser-known 
but important economic regulation cases. This was the case in Williams v Standard Oil Co, 
which struck down a Tennessee statute regulating the retail price of gasoline;250 in Fairmont 
Creamery Co v Minnesota, which invalidated regulation of the prices at which dairy products 
were purchased and sold;251 in Di Santo v Pennsylvania, where the Court held that a statute 
requiring that sellers of tickets for steamship travel to foreign countries secure a license and post 
a bond violated the foreign dormant Commerce Clause;252 and in the domestic dormant 
Commerce Clause case of Cudahy Packing Co v Hinkle, which struck down a state tax on an out-
of-state corporation.253 It was also the case in Weaver v Palmer Bros., where the Court struck 
down a statute prohibiting the use of shoddy in the manufacturing of bedding;254 in Cement 
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Manufacturers Protective v United States255 and Maple Flooring v United States,256 two major 
antitrust decisions of the period;257 in Quaker City Cab Co v Pennsylvania, where the Court 
invalidated as a denial of equal protection a gross receipts tax that applied to corporations 
operating taxicabs but not to partnerships or individuals engaged in the same trade;258  and in St. 
Louis & O’Fallon Co v United States, where the Court annulled a recapture order of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. 259 
Finally, none of the Justices budged in four closely divided decisions on the fractious 
subject of intergovernmental tax immunities, though the line-ups of the decisions differed. In 
Long v Rockwood260 Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Sutherland dissented both at conference and 
from the Court’s published decision holding that a state may not tax income received from 
patents issued by federal government. Stone’s docket book records question marks next to the 
conference votes of himself and Sutherland, but these two Justices ultimately stood firm with 
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their dissenting brethren.261 In Panhandle Oil Co v Mississippi,262 it was McReynolds who 
joined Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone at conference and in the published opinion in dissent from 
the majority’s holding that a state tax on gasoline was unconstitutional as applied to sales to 
federal government instrumentalities such as the Coast Guard Fleet and a Veterans’ Hospital.263 
In National Life Ins. Co v United States, Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone held fast to their 
conference dissents from the position that a federal tax on the income from state and local 
securities was unconstitutional.264 And in Macallen v Massachusetts,265 these same three Justices 
dissented both at conference and from the published decision invalidating a state tax on the 
income from federal securities.266 
On the other hand, there also were a number of nonunanimous decisions in which the 
vote did change between conference and the announcement of the Court’s decision. Although 
unanimity was not achieved in these cases, there often is evidence that the norm of acquiescence 
was at work. Most such vote changes involved a dissenter at conference joining the majority’s 
opinion or judgment. These cases involved both acquiescence and nonacquiescence. One or 
more, but not all, of the Justices changed conference votes to join the majority. However, there 
also were some instances of defection, and in some cases instances of acquiescence by one 
Justice combined with defection by another. That is, in some cases Justices switched positions 
with one another between the conference vote and the final vote on the merits. 
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First, let us consider examples where we can see the norm of acquiescence at work. In 
Chicago Board of Trade v Olsen,267 the Court upheld the Grain Futures Act of 1922.268 The vote 
was 7-2, with McReynolds and Sutherland dissenting without opinion. Taft rested his opinion for 
the majority on the stream of commerce theory that Holmes had adopted in his 1905 majority 
opinion in Swift v United States,269 and which the Court had applied to uphold the Packers and 
Stockyards Act of 1921270 in the 1922 decision of Stafford v Wallace.271 Holmes predictably had 
joined Taft’s majority opinion in Stafford, but at the conference vote in Olsen, he mysteriously 
voted with McReynolds and Sutherland.272 Butler’s docket book unfortunately provides no 
indication concerning why Holmes might have voted this way, nor why he might have decided 
ultimately to join the majority. 
In Jay Burns Baking Co v Bryan,273 the Court struck down a Nebraska statute regulating 
the weights of loaves of bread offered for sale. The vote was 7-2, with Brandeis and Holmes 
dissenting. At the conference, however, the vote was 5-4, with McKenna and Sutherland joining 
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Holmes and Brandeis in voting to uphold the statute.274 The decision was accorded a critical 
reception,275 but the Nebraska legislature soon enacted a revised bread-weight regulation 
designed to meet the Court’s objections.276 The Court unanimously upheld the revised statute in 
the 1934 case of Petersen Baking Co v Bryan.277 In that conference, Van Devanter passed, but 
everyone else voted to sustain the measure.278 
In Miles v Graham,279 the Court held that the salaries of federal judges were not subject to 
the federal income tax. At the conference, Taft pointed out that the 1920 case of Evans v Gore280 
had held that the federal “income tax is a diminution” of judicial compensation in violation of 
Article III’s prohibition. That case had involved a federal judge confirmed to his office before 
enactment of the challenged taxing statute. Miles involved a federal judge confirmed after the 
enactment of the challenged taxing statute. Holmes stated the he was “Inclined to limit Evans v 
Gore,” but that he had “no feelings about it” and would “defer to [the] majority.” Van Devanter 
indicated that he agreed with Taft that the case fell within the principle of Evans. McReynolds 
argued that the case presented a “Question of power.” There was “A stat[ute] prescribing 
compensation,” he observed. “It is paid at stated times. Then [it is] a tax on compensation.” 
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Brandeis stated that he would reverse the lower court decision holding that the judge’s salary 
was immune to income taxation.281 
Brandeis ultimately dissented alone and without opinion from the published decision, but at 
the conference he was joined in dissent by Holmes and Stone.282 The docket books thus confirm 
a claim that Stone made in a letter written to his sons in 1939, after Miles had been overruled: 
The Graham case was argued shortly after I came on the Court, and you will be interested 
to know that I joined Holmes and Brandeis in voting against the immunity of the judge’s 
salary from income tax. The same principle as in the Graham case had been laid down in 
Evans v Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), decided a year or two before I came on the Court. 
Holmes had written a dissent but he thought the Graham case indistinguishable in 
principle from the Gore case and therefore he and I concluded that we would not record a 
dissent. I have since regretted my action because it puts me apparently on record as 
supporting the majority decision which I thought then and still think wrong.283 
The phenomenon of post-conference acquiescence also occurred in some of the Court’s more 
important rulings under the dormant Commerce Clause. Texas Transport & Terminal Co, Inc v 
New Orleans284  invalidated a license tax on an interstate and foreign shipping business by a vote 
of 7-2, with Holmes and Brandeis dissenting. At the conference, however, they had been joined 
in dissent by Sanford.285 Buck v Kuykendall286 and George W. Bush & Sons v Maloy287 
invalidated state laws requiring interstate common carriers to obtain certificates of necessity 
before using public highways. McReynolds dissented alone without opinion from the published 
decision in each case, but at the Buck conference he was joined by Sutherland and Sanford, and 
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at the Bush conference he was joined by Sutherland.288 When the Court invalidated a similar 
requirement for intrastate carriers under the Due Process Clause in Frost & Frost Trucking Co v 
R.R. Commission of California,289 Holmes, McReynolds, and Brandeis dissented. At the 
conference, however, they had been joined by Sanford, who ultimately acquiesced in the 
decision.290 
In Carroll v United States,291 the Court affirmed a judgment upholding a warrantless search 
of an automobile suspected of uses violating the National Prohibition Act. At the December 8, 
1923 conference, Taft stated that there was “Ample evidence to sustain reasonable grounds for 
seizure. Adams case per Day, J.”292 It appears that the vote that day was 6-3 to affirm the 
conviction, with Sutherland, Butler, and Sanford in dissent. Butler’s docket book indicates that 
the case initially was assigned to McReynolds. However, Butler later erased the vote to affirm in 
McReynolds’s column, and added him to the ranks of the dissenters. It seems that on December 
22, “McR brought [the case] up for further conference.” Taft, Butler records, “suggests 
automobile differs from home.” Holmes, who appeared to agree with Taft, is recorded as saying 
“Different principles.” Brandeis also agreed, saying that the “Court could find business stopping 
& Arrest misdemeanor on suspicion.” Following this Butler writes, “Common law right of peace 
officer to arrest,” though it is not clear whether this was part of Brandeis’s statement. It may be 
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289 271 US 583 (1926). 
290 Stone OT 1925 Docket Book. 
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that these are the remarks of Taft at the March 29 conference held after reargument on March 
14.293 The remarks continued, “F. 294 page 776 what are reasonable grounds for belief of present 
commission. Must have ascertained facts. ‘In presence of’ = ‘immediate knowledge’.” Holmes is 
then recorded as saying, “Probable cause to surmise.”294 Following that conference, the vote was 
apparently 5-4, with McReynolds joining the dissenters from the earlier conference. When the 
published decision appeared nearly a year later, on March 2, 1925, however, only McReynolds 
and Sutherland dissented.295 Butler and Sanford had acquiesced in the majority’s judgment, 
while McReynolds remained resolute in his defection.296 
Black & White Taxicab Co v Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co297 involved a Kentucky taxicab 
concern that sought to enter into an enforceable exclusive service contract with a railroad. In 
order to avail itself of the favorable “general law” rule upholding such contracts that the federal 
courts applied when sitting in diversity, and to avoid application of the rule of the Kentucky state 
courts holding such contracts invalid, the company incorporated in Tennessee. The Court 
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296 The long delay in the production of the opinion may have been caused in part by vote changes 
after this last conference. Taft wrote to his brother that, after McReynolds had returned the case 
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297 276 US (1928). 
56 
 
affirmed the lower federal court’s application of the general law rule by a vote of 6-3, with 
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone dissenting. At the conference, however, the dissenters were joined 
by McReynolds,298 one of the principal expositors of what Holmes disparaged as the view that 
the common law was “a brooding omnipresence in the sky.”299 
In New York v Zimmerman,300 the Justices upheld the power of New York to require the 
Ku Klux Klan to disclose to the secretary of state its governing documents, officer roster, and 
membership list. The Klan argued that that requiring it to make such disclosure while excusing 
labor unions and other oath-bound organizations from such revelations denied the Klan equal 
protection, but only McReynolds dissented from Van Devanter’s opinion maintaining that the 
classification was justified because the Klan, unlike labor unions, had a tendency “to make the 
secrecy surrounding its purposes and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to 
personal rights and public welfare”; because it engaged in acts designed “‘to strike terror into the 
minds of the people’”; because “its membership was limited to native born, gentile, Protestant 
whites” and its members took an oath “to shield and preserve ‘white supremacy”’; and because 
“it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes and stimulating hurtful 
religious and race prejudices.”301 The near unanimity of the decision was achieved only because 
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the Chief Justice acquiesced, however. At the conference vote, Taft had been paired with 
McReynolds in dissent.302  
In Liggett Co v Baldridge,303 the Justices invalidated a statute requiring that each of the 
shareholders of any corporation owning and operating a drug store be a licensed pharmacist. The 
final vote on the merits was 7-2, with Brandeis joining Holmes in dissent. At the conference, 
however, McReynolds had passed, and Stone had placed a question mark next to his own vote to 
strike down the statute.304 Each of these Justices ultimately overcame his doubts sufficiently to 
join the majority opinion. And in United Railways & Electric Co v West, the Court invalidated a 
regulation imposing a passenger fare rate that permitted a return “so inadequate as to result in a 
deprivation of property in violation of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”305 Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone ultimately dissented, but at the conference 
McReynolds was with them as well.306 
Sometimes persistent divisions on the merits masked acquiescence on issues of 
jurisdiction. In Tyson & Bro. v Banton,307 for example, the New York statute regulating resale 
brokers of theater tickets returned to the Court. The Justices had upheld the statute’s provisions 
requiring licensure of such brokers two years earlier in Weller v New York, but Taft and perhaps 
others had expressed doubts in conference about the constitutionality of the statute’s price 
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regulation provisions. The Tyson Court invalidated those provisions, and the vote on the merits 
in conference and the published opinion were the same: 5-4, with Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and 
Sanford dissenting. But in conference there were three votes to dismiss the case on jurisdictional 
grounds: Holmes, McReynolds, and Brandeis. Sutherland’s majority opinion disposed of the 
jurisdictional question summarily, and these three registered no dissent from the Court’s 
resolution of that issue.308 
 Another price regulation case that came before the Court provides an illustration of quasi-
acquiescence. Ribnik v McBride309 concerned the constitutionality of state regulation of the fees 
charged by employment agencies. The case was ultimately decided by a vote of 6-3, with 
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone dissenting from the majority opinion invalidating the measure. In 
conference, however, the vote had been 5-2: Stone and Sanford had passed.310 These Justices 
ultimately resolved their doubts differently: Stone would write a lengthy dissent; Sanford would 
concur on the ground that he was bound by the authority of Tyson, from which he had dissented 
the previous year. An even clearer example of quasi-acquiescence is presented by Bedford Cut 
Stone Co v Journeymen Stone Cutters.311 There, over the dissents of Holmes and Brandeis, the 
Court held that a stonecutter union’s boycott of stone quarried by members of unaffiliated unions 
violated the Sherman Act. At the conference the vote had been 5-4, with Sanford and Stone 
joining their dissenting colleagues.312 In the published decision, however, each of them 
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concurred separately only because they felt themselves bound by the authority of Duplex 
Printing v Deering,313 an earlier decision that they were unable to distinguish.314 As Taft wrote, 
“while Sanford and Stone concur in our opinion, they do it grudgingly, Stone with a kind of 
kickback that will make nobody happy.”315 
 The Court’s nonunanimous decisions also occasionally featured the phenomenon of 
defection. Perhaps the best-known instance occurred in Village of Euclid v Ambler,316 a 
landmark decision upholding a comprehensive zoning law. The case was originally argued in 
January of 1926,317 and then reargued in October of that year.318 Two decades later, Alfred 
McCormack, Stone’s clerk for the 1925 Term, reported that Sutherland had been writing an 
opinion in the case “holding the zoning ordinance unconstitutional, when talks with his 
dissenting brethren (principally Stone, I believe) shook his convictions and led him to request a 
reargument, after which he changed his mind and the ordinance was upheld.”319 On the basis of 
McCormack’s brief report, Alpheus Thomas Mason offered a more elaborate account, claiming 
that Stone, along “[w]ith Brandeis and Holmes, who had also disagreed with the decision in 
conference…carried on the argument with the opinion writer Justice Sutherland….Under Stone’s 
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313 254 US 443 (1921). 
314 274 US at 55 (Sanford concurring); 274 US at 55-56 (Stone concurring). 
315 W.H. Taft to Robert A. Taft, Apr 10, 1927, quoted in Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone at 259 
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316 272 US 365 (1926). 
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persistent hammering…Sutherland began to doubt the correctness of his conclusion and asked 
for reargument. On the second hearing Sutherland changed his mind.”320  
This story has been repeated many times,321 but elements of its accuracy have been called 
into question. Dean Post points out that nine months before Euclid was argued, Sutherland 
prepared a memorandum for Taft concerning another zoning case that the Court ultimately 
dismissed on procedural grounds. In that memorandum, Sutherland wrote that “[i]n the modern 
development of cities and towns, zoning laws are universally recognized as necessary and 
proper. The question presented by the law under review is a matter of degree, and I am not 
prepared to say that the judgment of the local law makers was arbitrarily exercised.”322 This 
would seem to make it less likely that Sutherland would have voted initially to invalidate the 
ordinance challenged in Euclid. Others have pointed out that because Sutherland did not hear the 
initial argument of the case, it is “unlikely” that the opinion would have been assigned to him,323 
and that “Sutherland was even less likely to have formed a negative opinion (or any other 
opinion) following the first hearing of the case--since he did not participate in it.”324 Some have 
maintained that the reargument was in fact suggested by Stone, who “as a new member of the 
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Court . . . was not fully conversant with the situation.”325 It also has been suggested that the 
reargument was ordered to provide the Court with more time to deliberate about the case and to 
permit an interested party to submit an amicus curiae brief that might better educate the Justices 
about the fundamentals of zoning.326 Finally, it has been observed that “while the case was 
reargued, in order for a majority intending to strike down the ordinance to transform into a six to 
three majority to refrain from doing so, at least one other Justice (apart from Sutherland) must 
have switched his vote.”327 
 Stone’s docket books do not resolve all of these questions definitively, but they do shed 
considerable light on a number of them. Stone records that when the case was discussed in 
conference on February 13, Sutherland did participate in the deliberations. Stone records the vote 
as 5-3 to invalidate the ordinance, with Brandeis, Sanford, and Stone dissenting, and Holmes not 
voting. He records Sutherland in the majority along with his fellow Horsemen and Taft. 
Interestingly, however, Stone placed question marks next to both his own and Sutherland’s votes, 
suggesting that each of them was uncertain about the positions that they had taken. This record, 
taken in combination with Sutherland’s earlier memo to Taft on zoning, casts doubt on the notion 
that Stone was rock-solid in his views and that Sutherland was brought around by Stone’s 
“persistent hammering.” It seems more likely that these two establishment Republicans discussed 
their own doubts with one another, perhaps only at the 1925 conference, and were sufficiently 
unsettled in their convictions to want to hear more argument. Moreover, though Stone typically 
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signified opinion assignments by inscribing a large “X” next to the name of the Justice selected, 
his docket book record of the 1925 Term Euclid conference contains no indication that the 
opinion was assigned to Sutherland, nor to anyone else. Instead, on the same page of Stone’s 
1925 docket book, written in by another hand, appears “Rehearing suggested by Sutherland, J., 
and case set down for rehearing October Term 1926.” This entry bears no date, but it was in all 
likelihood written by McCormack, and based upon information provided to him by Stone.328 
When the Justices met on October 26 to discuss the case again after reargument, Stone recorded 
the vote as identical to the breakdown in the published decision: 6-3, with Van Devanter, 
McReynolds, and Butler dissenting. Holmes registered his vote in favor of sustaining the 
ordinance, and both Sutherland and Taft abandoned their earlier positions and joined the new 
majority.329 
 Some instances of defection involved a Justice who had passed at conference deciding to 
cast a lone dissenting vote rather than to acquiesce and make a unanimous Court. Perhaps the 
most prominent of these involves Butler, at the time the Court’s lone Catholic, who dissented 
without opinion from the Court’s decision upholding Virginia’s eugenic sterilization statute in 
Buck v Bell.330 Yet Stone’s docket book reveals that Butler did not register his dissenting vote at 
conference. Instead, he alone passed.331 It was only after the conference that Butler resolved his 
doubts in favor of nonacquiescence. Similarly, McReynolds dissented alone from the Court’s 
decision in Foster-Fountain Packing Co v Haydel332 striking down as a violation of the dormant 
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Commerce Clause a Louisiana statute that sought to force shrimp producers to pack shrimp 
harvested in Louisiana within state. At the conference, however, McReynolds had merely 
passed.333 United States v One Ford Coupe Automobile,334 by contrast, involved an instance of 
defection from the majority to the dissent. There the Court upheld and interpreted broadly 
various seizure and taxation provisions of the Supplementary Prohibition Act. At the conference 
vote only Sutherland and Butler dissented. In the published decision, however, Stone concurred 
separately, and McReynolds defected from the majority to join Sutherland and Butler in 
opposition.335 
 There also were instances in which Justices passed one another crossing the line between 
majority and minority. In Helson v Kentucky,336 for example, the Court by a vote of 6-3 struck 
down a state tax on gasoline purchased out of state and used to power an interstate ferry as 
violating the dormant Commerce Clause. The dissenters were Holmes, McReynolds, and 
Brandeis. At the conference, however, Brandeis had passed, Holmes had voted with the majority, 
and Stone had voted with the dissent. Holmes and Stone exchanged places between the 
conference vote and the final decision.337 In Louisville Gas & Electric Co v Coleman, a 5-4 
Court held that a state tax imposed upon mortgages that did not mature within five years but 
exempting those that did violated the Equal Protection Clause. The dissenters were Holmes, 
Brandeis, Sanford, and Stone,338 but Stone records that at the initial conference it was Holmes, 
Brandeis, Stone, and McReynolds who voted to uphold the tax, and Taft, Van Devanter, Butler, 
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and Sanford voting to strike it down. Sutherland was ill and absent from the conference, so the 
equally divided Court set the case down for reargument. After the reargument, Sanford switched 
sides to vote in favor of the statute, while McReynolds shifted to the side favoring invalidation. 
Stone placed a question mark in Sutherland’s column, indicating that at the conclusion of the 
second conference the Justices remained equally divided. Eventually, however, Sutherland 
resolved his uncertainty sufficiently to make a majority nullifying the law.339 
 United Leather Workers v Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co340 may also fall into this category. 
There the Court held that a strike for a closed shop, conducted by means of illegal picketing and 
intimidation, did not violate the Sherman Act. Though the strike admittedly was designed to 
prevent the manufacture of goods to be shipped in interstate commerce, there was no evidence 
that the strikers had sought to interfere with the transport or sale of goods once they had been 
manufactured. Because the effect of the strikers’ conduct on interstate commerce was therefore 
“indirect” rather than “direct,” Chief Taft’s majority opinion maintained that their activities lay 
beyond the reach of federal authority, and were subject only to state regulation.  
This is precisely the position that Taft had taken at conference. There was, he stated, “No 
evidence of restraint of interstate commerce.” Van Devanter, who dissented without opinion 
along with McKenna and Butler, argued at the conference that the “Restraint [was] direct.” Yet 
the final vote of 6-3 belies the configuration in conference. At the conference vote, Butler 
records a vote of 5-4, with Van Devanter joined not only by McKenna, but also by McReynolds 
and Sanford. Moreover, Butler places himself in the majority. Thus, it appears that between the 
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conference and the final opinion, three votes changed: McReynolds and Sanford moved from the 
minority to the majority, and Butler moved from the majority to the minority.341 
 Finally, among the most interesting instances of defection were those in which the 
unanimity of a conference vote was shattered by a Justice’s later change of heart. For example, 
the vote in Samuels v McCurdy, in which Butler dissented from an opinion upholding a Georgia 
statute authorizing seizure and destruction of alcohol that had been purchased legally before the 
enactment of the statute,342 was unanimous to affirm at conference.343 And in Toyota v United 
States, which held that a Japanese national born in Japan was not eligible for naturalization,344  
the vote at conference was unanimous,345 but the Chief Justice himself – the Court’s great 
proponent of the acquiescence norm -- dissented without opinion from the published decision. 
V.  REASSIGNMENTS 
Van Devanter was valued highly by his colleagues for his contributions to conference 
discussions346 and his comments on the draft opinions of others. But his “pen paralysis,” as 
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Sutherland called it, left him notoriously incapable of producing written opinions promptly.347 
During the nine Terms of the Taft Court, Van Devanter authored only ninety-eight (6.07 %) of 
the Court’s majority opinions.348 It has been reported in a general way that “[s]everal times Taft 
was forced tactfully to reassign to other Justices cases originally given to Van Devanter so that 
they could be decided within a reasonable period of time,”349 but the extent and details of this 
practice never have been documented. The docket books enable us to undertake such 
documentation. 
For the 1922 Term, Butler notes that two cases were transferred from McKenna, one each 
to Taft350 and Brandeis.351 Sutherland and Sanford also traded cases in late April.352 Van 
Devanter, who wrote sixteen (7.11 %) of the Term’s majority opinions,353 is not recorded as 
transferring any cases. During the 1923 Term, Van Devanter wrote twenty (9.43 %) of the 
Court’s majority opinions, and two dissents.354 That Term he released a case to Brandeis355 and 
one to Sutherland,356 but he also absorbed from McKenna a case in which the latter ultimately 
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dissented.357 That year McReynolds also gave up two cases to Taft.358 During the 1924 Term, 
Taft became ill, and relied upon Van Devanter to run the conference.359 Van Devanter’s output 
dropped to twelve (5.22 %) of the Court’s majority opinions and two dissents,360 as he gave up 
eight cases.361 In January Van Devanter took on a case initially assigned to Sutherland, but by 
early April he had relinquished it to Brandeis.362 Taft transferred one to McKenna363 and 
received one from Brandeis;364 Brandeis absorbed one from McReynolds;365 and Holmes took 
one from Sanford.366  
Van Devanter’s output rebounded for the 1925 Term, during which he authored 
seventeen (8.13 %) of the majority opinions and one dissent.367 Stone’s docket book contains no 
indication that any opinions were reassigned during the Term.368 During the 1926 Term, 
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however, Van Devanter’s workload began a slide from which it never fully recovered. That year 
he wrote ten (5.03 %) of the majority opinions and two dissents,369 while giving up ten opinions 
and absorbing none.370 That Term Taft gave up one opinion to Holmes371 and two to Brandeis,372 
and took two from McReynolds.373 Sanford gave up two opinions to Holmes374 and one to 
Brandeis.375 During the 1927 Term, Van Devanter’s production slipped to eight (4.62 %) of the 
majority opinions and one concurrence.376 That year Van Devanter gave up six cases and 
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375 No 257, United States v McCarl. Stone OT 1926 Docket Book. 
376 Renstrom, The Taft Court at 269 (cited in note 4). 
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absorbed none.377 Holmes gave one to Butler,378 and he took a case from Sutherland379 in which 
the latter ultimately dissented.380 
The final two Terms of the Taft Court saw Van Devanter’s written contributions decline 
even further. During the 1928 Term he authored four (3.1 %) of the Court’s majority opinions 
and three dissents.381 It appears that Taft had determined to give him fewer assignments, as he 
gave up only two cases that year and again absorbed none.382 The only other recorded 
reassignments for the 1928 Term were two cases transferred from Sanford, one to Holmes383 and 
one to McReynolds.384 The 1929 Term was marked by the retirement of Taft and the death of 
Sanford while in office, and their replacements by Charles Evans Hughes and Owen Roberts, 
respectively. Most of the reassignments of the Term thus involved transfers from Taft or Sanford 
                                                          
377 Van Devanter transferred two opinions to McReynolds, No 131, Mellon v Goodyear, and No 
225, Plamals v The Pinar Del Rio; two to Sutherland, No 62, Grosfield v United States, and No 
207, Montana National Bank of Billings v Yellowstone County; one to Butler, No 139, Quaker 
City Cab Co v Pennsylvania; and one to Sanford, No 205, National Leather Co v Massachusetts. 
Stone OT 1927 Docket Book. 
378 No 110, Donnelley v United States. Stone OT 1927 Docket Book. 
379 Nos. 407-18, Ferry v Ramsey. Stone OT 1927 Docket Book. 
380 277 US 88, 95 (1928) (Sutherland dissenting). Stone noted that Nos 150-51, Denney v Pacific 
Telephone and Telegraph Co, a case in which he ultimately took no part, 267 US 97, 104 (1928), 
was “assigned to Justice Stone by mistake” and transferred to McReynolds. Stone OT 1927 
Docket Book. 
381 Renstrom, The Taft Court at 270 (cited in note 4). 
382 Van Devanter gave up No 305, United States v Fruit Growers’ Express Co, to Taft and No 8, 
Highland v Russell Car and Snowplow Co, to Butler. Stone OT 1928 Docket Book. 
383 No 513, United States v American Livestock Commission Co. Stone OT 1928 Docket Book. 
384 No 530 Bekins Van Lines, Inc v Riley. Stone OT 1928 Docket Book. 
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to another Justice.385 In addition, Brandeis took a case from Sutherland,386 and Hughes took one 
from Holmes.387 Van Devanter’s output dropped to one majority opinion, one concurrence, and 
two dissents.388 Indeed, it appears that he did not receive any initial assignments, for the one 
majority opinion that he did write was a transfer from McReynolds.389 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Butler and Stone docket books provide us with a variety of valuable insights into the 
inner workings of the Taft Court. First, the docket books show that instances in which cases were 
reassigned on the Taft Court typically involved illness, death, a mid-Term retirement, a voting 
shift following conference, or the direct or indirect effects of Justice Van Devanter’s increasing 
inability to discharge his literary burdens. Second, Stone’s docket books help to clarify a series 
of questions about the deliberations in Village of Euclid v Ambler. Sutherland did vote in the 
initial conference on the case, and it seems that he was indeed the driving force behind the order 
for reargument. But Sutherland apparently expressed at the conference his doubts about his 
initial vote to invalidate the ordinance, and Stone also expressed at the conference reservations 
                                                          
385 See No 31, Gunning v Cooley, transferred from Taft to Butler; Nos 15-16, Wheeler Lumber 
Bridge and Supply Co v United States and Indian Motor Cycle Co v United States, which on May 
26, 1930 were transferred from Taft to Van Devanter and restored to the docket for reargument; 
No 104, National Fire Insurance Co of Hartford v Thompson, transferred from Sanford to 
Butler; No 19, Alexander Sprunt and Son v United States, transferred from Sanford to Brandeis; 
No 248, Nogueira v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co, transferred from Sanford 
to Hughes; No 356, Lucas v Pilliod Lumber Co, transferred from Sanford to McReynolds; and 
Nos 10-11, Powers Kennedy Contracting Corp v Concrete Mixing and Conveying Co, 
transferred from Taft to Sanford, and then reargued after Sanford’s death. Stone OT 1929 Docket 
Book. Powers Kennedy was reargued Oct 24, 1930, and was decided Dec 15 of that year in a 
unanimous opinion written by Sanford’s successor, Owen Roberts. 282 US 175 (1930). 
386 Nos 443-45, Campbell v Galeno Chemical Co. Stone OT 1929 Docket Book. 
387 Nos 372-74, City of Cincinnati v Vester. Stone OT 1929 Docket Book. 
388 Renstrom, The Taft Court at 271 (cited in note 4). 
389 No 122, Federal Radio Commission v General Electric Co. Stone OT 1929 Docket Book. 
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about his own vote to uphold it. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the opinion was assigned before 
the Justices agreed to order reargument. Stone’s record of the deliberations also shows that it was 
Taft who joined Sutherland in defecting from the original conference majority and making a 
supermajority to sustain Euclid’s zoning law. 
The docket books also show that by 1925 a majority of the Justices believed that Adkins v 
Children’s Hospital had been wrongly decided, and that the precedent survived two challenges 
only because of stare decisis. They disclose that Frothingham v Mellon and Florida v Mellon, 
two foundational decisions in the development of the national welfare state, were uncontroversial 
at conference. They reveal in addition that Brandeis, Holmes, and possibly even Sanford came 
close to dissenting in Whitney v California. And they demonstrate that none of the Justices voted 
to invalidate racially segregated education in Gong Lum v Rice. 
We also learn from the docket books that the Court’s published decisions are somewhat 
misleading concerning the civil rights and civil liberties views of Taft, Holmes, and 
McReynolds. Though he ultimately joined majorities favoring such claims in several cases, at 
conference the Chief Justice dissented from dispositions that he would publicly join in Fasulo v 
United States, Byars v United States, and New York v Zimmerman. Holmes likewise ultimately 
joined the Byars majority, but he was with Taft in dissent at the conference. And though both of 
these men were in the end with the rest of their colleagues in Agnello v United States, at 
conference each of them had assumed a posture that was at best equivocal. Similarly, 
McReynolds dissented at conference from positions that he ultimately would appear to endorse 
in Byars and Cooke v United States, and though he joined the published opinions in Fasulo and 
Ziang Sung Wan v United States, at the conference vote he had passed in each case. On the other 
hand, McReynolds took some surprising conference positions in cases involving questions of 
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political economy. Though he ultimately joined majorities to invalidate the regulations 
challenged in Liggett v Baldridge and United Railways & Electric Co v West, he passed at the 
conference on the former and dissented at the conference on the latter. Perhaps most notably, at 
the conference vote on Black & White Taxicab Co v Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co, McReynolds 
was with Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone in dissent. 
The docket books also reveal considerable fluidity between the initial conference vote 
and the final vote on the merits among the Justices of the Taft Court. First, there were eight 
instances of defection to the minority in major cases. McReynolds was responsible for three of 
these, departing from conference votes with the majority in Carroll and One Ford Coupe, and 
from a passing conference vote in Haydel. Butler accounted for another two, departing from a 
conference vote with the majority in Samuels and from a passing conference vote in Buck v Bell. 
Taft abandoned a majority conference vote in Toyota, as did Holmes in Helson. And Stone 
departed from his passing conference vote in Ribnik. 
Second, there also were shifts in voting that created majorities in favor of dispositions 
contrary to those produced at conference. In Oliver Iron, each of the Justices comprising the 
conference majority to reverse ultimately changed his vote to form a unanimous Court for 
affirmance. At the Gambino conference only Butler and Stone voted to reverse the conviction, 
but ultimately each of their colleagues joined them in the unanimous decision to reverse. And in 
Euclid, Taft and Sutherland defected from the initial conference majority to form a new majority 
to uphold rather than invalidate the Village’s pioneering zoning ordinance. 
Third, there were four instances of quasi-acquiescence. The published per curiam opinion 
in Murphy v Sardell stated that Holmes concurred only because he regarded himself as bound by 
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the recent authority of Adkins v Children’s Hospital. Sanford passed at the Ribnik conference, 
but ultimately concurred in the result on the ground that the case was governed by Tyson. And 
both Sanford and Stone cast dissenting ballots at the Bedford Cut Stone conference, but 
ultimately concurred on the ground that the case was governed by Duplex Printing.  
Fourth, there was more than one instance in which Justices who had been in opposing 
camps at conference switched places before the final vote on the merits. In Helson, this 
movement did not change the ultimate disposition: Stone’s acquiescence in the views of the 
majority offset Holmes’s defection to the minority. Similarly, in Coleman, Sutherland’s absence 
from the first conference and irresolution at the second meant that the post-reargument exchange 
of places between McReynolds and Sanford did not meaningfully alter the deadlocked status 
quo.390 Due to the difficulties of interpretation presented by Butler’s docket book record of the 
United Leather Workers conference, one cannot rely upon that source for a definitive account of 
what transpired.  But it appears that three votes changed between the conference vote and the 
final vote on the merits, with McReynolds and Sanford moving from the minority to the majority 
while Butler moved from the majority to the minority.391 
                                                          
390 Depending on the sequence of vote changes, one or the other of these Justices was 
presumably defecting from a newly-constituted majority. But as the docket books do not reveal 
the sequence, they cannot inform us which of the Justices was the defector. Therefore I do not 
include this among the instances of defection listed above, though it might properly be added to 
the roster. 
391 Again, depending on the sequence of vote changes, these Justices may have been either 
acquiescing in or defecting from the majority. But as the docket books do not reveal the 
sequence, they cannot inform us which of the Justices should be characterized in which way. 
Therefore I do not include this among the instances of defection listed above, nor among the 
instances of acquiescence canvassed below. 
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The most common form of vote fluidity in major cases before the Taft Court, however, 
was acquiescence. Of the sixty-five unanimous decisions discussed here, thirty-nine (60 %) also 
were unanimous at conference, but twenty-six (40 %) were not. This observation is consistent 
with earlier studies finding that conformity voting is the most common form of vote fluidity.392 
The frequency with which each of the Justices acquiesced in the views of the majority is worthy 
of note. The notoriously cantankerous and disagreeable Justice McReynolds was actually the 
member of the Court who most frequently acquiesced in a major decision in order to produce 
unanimity. Of the twenty-six unanimous decisions examined here that were not unanimous at 
conference, McReynolds acquiesced in eleven (42.3 %). Holmes acquiesced in eight (30.7 %), 
Taft, Brandeis, and Sutherland in five (19.2 %) each, McKenna and Van Devanter in four (15.4 
%) each, Butler in three (11.5 %), and Sanford and Stone in two (7.7 %) each. Of these forty-
nine instances of acquiescence, thirty-eight (77.6 %) were of the strong variety and eleven (22.4 
%) were of the weak variety.393  
                                                          
392 See, for example, Maltzman and Wahlbeck, 90 Am Pol Sci Rev at 590-91 (cited in note 4) 
(finding that Justices were more likely to move from a dissenting conference vote to the majority 
than to defect from the conference majority); Brenner and Dorff, 4 J Theoretical Polit at 198 
(cited in note 55) (finding that movement from conference minority to ultimate majority is the 
most frequent type of vote fluidity); Brenner, 26 Am J Pol Sci at 389 (cited in note 4) (finding 
that 68 % of the cases in which there was vote fluidity resulted in an increase in the size of the 
majority); Brenner, 24 Am J Pol Sci at 531, 534 (cited in note 4) (“justices are more likely to 
switch from the minority or nonparticipation at the original vote to the majority position at the 
final vote than to shift in the opposite direction….Clearly, some of the justices, once they have 
lost at the original vote or failed to participate in that vote, are willing to conform to the opinion 
of the court’s majority and vote with them at the final vote. Indeed, over three-quarters of the 
vote changes moved in a consensus direction.”) 
393 Nine of McReynolds’s eleven acquiescences in ultimately unanimous case were strong 
(Radice, Brooks, Window Glass Manufacturers, Panama Railroad, Roberge, Fiske, Yu Cong 
Eng, Byars, and Cooke), while two were weak (Fasulo and Ziang). Holmes’s acquiescences in 
Coronado Coal II, Yu Cong Eng, and Byars were strong, and his acquiescence in Whitney was 
strong as to result if not as to First Amendment theory. His remaining four acquiescences were of 
the weak variety (Duke, Nectow, Duby, and Agnello). Four of Taft’s five acquiescences were 
75 
 
With respect to cases that did not produce unanimity, McReynolds, Holmes, and Sanford 
acquiesced in four each, Sutherland in three, McKenna, Brandeis, and Stone in two each, and 
Taft and Butler in one each. The only member of the Court who did not acquiesce in any of these 
divided decisions was Van Devanter. Of these twenty-three instances of acquiescence, twenty-
one (91.3 %) were of the strong variety, and only two (8.7 %) were of the weak sort.394  Thus, of 
these seventy-two total instances of acquiescence in major Taft Court cases, fifty-nine (81.9 %) 
were of the strong variety, and thirteen (18.1 %) were of the weak variety. McReynolds alone 
was responsible for 20.8 % of these instances of acquiescence, recording fifteen in all. Holmes 
accounted for twelve (16.7 %), Sutherland for eight (11.1 %), Brandeis for seven (9.7 %), Taft, 
McKenna, and Sanford for six (8.3 %) each, and Van Devanter, Butler, and Stone for four (5.6 
%) each. Expressed as a percentage of acquiescences per conference vote in which he 
participated, McReynolds acquiesced in 12.9 % of such cases, Holmes did so in 10.2 %, 
Sutherland in 7.5 %, Brandeis in 6 %, Taft in 5.1 %, Butler in 3.5 %, and Van Devanter in 3.4 
                                                          
strong (Window Glass Manufacturers, Industrial Association, Fasulo, and Byars), while one was 
weak (Agnello). Brandeis’s acquiescences in Coronado Coal II, Nectow, Corrigan, and McGrain 
were all of the strong variety, and his acquiescence in Whitney was strong as to result if not as to 
First Amendment theory. Each of Sutherland’s five acquiscences was strong (Brooks, Metcalf, 
Trusler, Roberge, and Ziang), as were McKenna’s four (Radice, Window Glass Manufacturers, 
Dayton-Goose Creek, and Ziang) and Van Devanter’s four (Radice, Trusler, Corrigan, Ziang). 
Butler acquiesced strongly in Radice and Corrigan but only weakly in Lee. Sanford acquiesced 
strongly in Roberge but weakly in Duby. And Stone acquiesced weakly in both Nectow and 
Roberge. 
394 McReynolds acquiesced strongly in Black and White Taxicab, West, and on the jurisdictional 
issue in Tyson, but weakly in Liggett. Holmes acquiesced strongly in Olsen, Shafer, and on the 
jurisdictional issue in Tyson, and though he expressed at the Miles conference his willingness to 
defer to the majority, his dissenting conference vote qualifies his acquiescence in that decision as 
strong also. Sanford acquiesced strongly in Texas Transport, Buck v Kuykendall, Frost, and 
Carroll. Sutherland acquiesced strongly in Jay Burns, Buck v Kuykendall, and Bush, while 
McKenna acquiesced strongly in Jay Burns but weakly in Olsen. Brandeis acquiesced strongly in 
the jurisdictional holding in Tyson, but weakly in Helson. Stone acquiesced strongly in both 
Miles and Helson, as did Taft in Zimmerman and Butler in Carroll. 
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%.395 The fact that McReynolds and Holmes were the Taft Court Justices who most frequently 
acquiesced in major decisions echoes Professor Saul Brenner’s finding that on the Vinson Court 
“extreme justices [were] most likely to be closer to the mean at the final vote than at the original 
vote,” because “extreme justices are likely to lose more often at the original vote.”396 
                                                          
395 Van Devanter did not participate in the conference vote in Nixon v Herndon; McReynolds did 
not do so in Miller v Schoene; Brandeis did not participate in Adkins; Sutherland did not 
participate in the conference votes in Panama Railroad, Frick v Webb, Webb v O’Brien, 
Porterfield v Webb, Terrace v Thompson, Gambino, Roschen, Alston, Gong Lum, Northwestern 
Mututal, or Whitney; and Butler did not participate in the conference votes for O’Fallon or 
Oliver Iron. 
The numbers for these major cases are generally consistent with Dean Post’s finding of 
the total number of times each of the Justices changed his conference vote to join the Court’s 
opinion. McReynolds was first with 99; Brandeis second with 95; Sanford third with 93; 
Sutherland fourth with 87; Holmes fifth with 80; Butler sixth with 60; Taft seventh with 48; Van 
Devanter eighth with 45; McKenna ninth with 38; and Stone last with 35. Expressed as a 
percentage of the decisions in which he participated, McKenna led the Court by acquiescing in 
10.3 %, McReynolds was next with 9.3 %, followed by Brandeis, Sanford and Sutherland each 
comfortably above 8 %, Holmes well over 7 %, Stone and Butler over 5 %, Taft at 4.7 %, and 
Van Devanter at 3.9 %. As Dean Post observes, however, these percentages might be misleading 
for the reason that Taft and Van Devanter rarely cast dissenting votes in conference. When one 
looks at the rate at which each of the Justices was willing to change a dissenting conference vote 
and join the majority in the final vote on the merits, a different picture appears. McKenna again 
led the Court by doing so in nearly 90 % of the cases in which he was a conference dissenter, but 
Van Devanter did so in 83.3 %, Taft did so in 80 %, followed by Sanford, Sutherland, and Butler 
each above 70 %, Holmes in 60 %, McReynolds in 59.3 %, Brandeis in 57.2 %, and Stone in 50 
%. Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1333-34 n 203, 1377-78 (cited in note 2). 
396 Saul Brenner, Ideological Voting on the Vinson Court: A Comparison of Original & Final 
Votes on the Merits, 22 Polity 157, 163 (1989). An examination of these cases also provides 
some indication of the success of each of the Justices in preparing opinions that would attract 
colleagues who had dissented or passed at conference. In his study of all Taft Court opinions that 
became unanimous following a divided conference vote, Dean Post determined that Van 
Devanter did so at the highest rate and that McKenna was the least successful in doing so. 
Following Van Devanter in descending order were Butler, Sutherland, Holmes, Stone, 
McReynolds, Brandeis, Taft, and Sanford. Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1334 n 203, 1388 (cited in 
note 2). If we exclude Whitney, which was unanimous only as to the judgment, there were 
twenty-five major cases that became unanimous after a divided conference vote. McKenna 
accounted for none of these, thus mirroring Dean Post’s aggregate result. Similarly, though he 
wrote comparatively few opinions, Van Devanter accounted for three (Oliver Iron, McGrain, 
Panama Railroad), or 12 %. Sutherland (Industrial Association, Byars, Radice, Nectow) and 
Butler (Agnello, Fasulo, Roberge, Duke) also again performed strongly in this category, each 
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These figures also speak to another debate in the political science literature. Some studies 
of voting fluidity conclude that “justices were no more likely to change their votes in important, 
or salient, cases than in those of lesser importance.”397 Others conclude that acquiescence was in 
                                                          
accounting for four, or 16 %. Brandeis also accounted for three (Ziang, Lee, Gambino), or 12 %, 
and Sanford’s record of two (Corrigan, Fiske), or 8 %, was consistent with his comparatively 
weak aggregate performance. Holmes (Window Glass Manufacturers), Stone (Metcalf), and 
McReynolds (Trusler), however, who were in the middle of the aggregate pack, each accounted 
for only one such opinion in a major case, or 4 % each. By contrast, Taft, who was in the bottom 
third in the aggregate, was the author of six such major opinions (Dayton Goose-Creek, Brooks, 
Yu Cong Eng, Cooke, Coronado Coal, Duby), or fully 24 % of the total. 
This phenomenon also can be examined by looking at the percentage of unanimous 
opinions authored by a Justice that were not unanimous at conference. Overall, Dean Post found 
that Butler had the highest such percentage at 53 %, followed by Holmes at about 50 %, 
Sutherland at about 47 %, Van Devanter at about 46 %, Stone at around 40 %, Brandeis at about 
37 %, McReynolds at about 36 %, Taft at about 35 %, Sanford at about 33 %, and McKenna at 
24 %. Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1334 n 203, 1389 (cited in note 2). When we examine the smaller 
number of major cases, we see substantial changes in ordinality. Here Van Devanter ranks first at 
75 % (3/4), Sanford second at 66.7 % (2/3), Butler third at 57 % (4/7), Taft fourth at 46.2 % 
(6/13), Sutherland fifth at 44.4 % (4/9), Brandeis sixth at 42.9 % (3/7), Stone seventh at 25 % 
(1/4), Holmes eighth at 20 % (1/5), and McReynolds ninth at a remarkable 9.1 % (1/11). 
McKenna did not author any major unanimous opinions. 
These data also should be viewed in light of divided major decisions in which the author 
failed to increase the size of the conference majority. Neither Holmes, McKenna, Van Devanter, 
nor Sanford authored any such decisions; but of the twenty-two such cases, McReynolds was the 
author of six (Meyer, Cudahy Packing, Fairmont Creamery, O’Fallon, Long v Rockwood, 
National Life), Sutherland of three (Adkins, Williams v Standard Oil, Macallen), Taft of two 
(Olmstead, Myers), and Brandeis of one (Lambert). Stone was the author of two such companion 
cases (Cement Manufacturers, Maple Flooring) that were decided by identical votes and 
therefore might be more properly considered as one. Depending upon whether one counts the 
four companion Alien Land Law Cases (Frick v Webb, Webb v O’Brien, Porterfield v Webb, 
Terrace v Thompson) as four cases or one, Butler was the author of either eight or five. (The 
other four were Di Santo, Weaver v Palmer Brothers, Quaker City Cab, Panhandle Oil). Thus, 
some of the Justices who were apparently most adept at attracting additional votes in major cases 
were also among those who most often failed to do so.  
One should also consider cases in which the author of an opinion managed to attract 
additional votes, but failed to achieve unanimity. Sutherland did so in Texas Transport, Frost 
Trucking, Liggett, and West; Taft did so in Carroll and Olsen; Butler did so in Jay Burns and 
Black and White Taxicab; Van Devanter did so in Shafer and Zimmerman; Brandeis did so in the 
companion cases of Buck v Kuykendall and Bush; and McReynolds did so in Miles. 
397 Hagle and Spaeth, 44 Western Pol Q at 124 (cited in note 4). See also Maltzman and 
Wahlbeck, 90 Am Pol Sci Rev at 589 (cited in note 4) (finding that “justices are not less likely to 
switch in salient cases”); Brenner, Hagle, and  Spaeth, 42 Western Pol Q 409 (cited in note 4) 
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fact more likely to occur in cases that were not “salient.”398 Dean Post has determined the 
percentage of all cases in which each of the Taft Court Justices changed his vote following the 
conference and ultimately joined the Court’s opinion. With respect to those Justices who served 
on the Taft Court for the entire period for which we have docket books, a comparison of Dean 
Post’s figures to those generated in this article produces an interesting result: some of the 
Justices were more likely to acquiesce in major cases than they were in cases of lower salience, 
whereas other were less likely to do so. Among the former category were McReynolds, Holmes, 
and Taft. McReynolds’s overall acquiescence rate was 9.3 %, but his rate in major cases was 
12.9 %. Holmes’s overall rate was between 7 and 8 %, but his major case rate was 10.2 %. Taft’s 
overall rate was 4.7 %, but his major case rate was 5.1 %. By contrast, Brandeis, Sutherland, 
Butler, and Van Devanter each had higher overall rates of acquiescence than rates of 
acquiescence in major cases. For Brandeis the figures were 8-9 % vs 6 %; for Sutherland they 
were 8-9 % vs 7.5 %; for Butler they were 5-6 % vs 3.5 %; and for Van Devanter they were 3.9 
% vs 3.4 %.399  
For the Court as a whole, however, acquiescence was actually more likely in salient than 
in nonsalient cases. Overall there were 680 instances of acquiescence in 1200 cases,400 or a rate 
                                                          
(concluding that the defection of the marginal member of the minimum winning coalition on the 
Warren Court is best explained not by the importance of the case, but instead by that Justice’s 
ideological proximity to members of the dissenting coalition and, secondarily, to that Justice’s 
relative lack of competence). 
398 Dorff and Brenner, 54 J Pol at 772, 773 (cited in note 4); Brenner, Hagle, and Spaeth, 23 
Polity 309 (cited in note 4). Compare Brenner, 24 Am J Pol Sci at 530 (cited in note 4) (finding 
that percentage of total vote switches was no greater in “nonmajor” than in “major” cases, but 
that vote switches occurred in a higher percentage of “nonmajor” cases); Brenner, 26 Am J Pol 
Sci at 389 (cited in note 4) (reaching similar conclusions with a different data set). 
399 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1333 n 203, 1387 (cited in note 2). 
400 Post, 85 Minn L Rev at 1333 (cited in note 2). 
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of 56.6 %. In the major cases examined here, by contrast, there were 72 instances of 
acquiescence in 117 cases, or a rate of 61.5 %. But when one looks at cases rather than votes, a 
different picture emerges. Whereas 55.6 % of the Taft Court’s decisions in major cases were 
unanimous, only 33.3 % were unanimous at conference. By contrast, the Taft Court’s overall rate 
of unanimity was 86 %, and in 50 % of its cases the vote was unanimous at conference.401 At the 
same time, however, 58 % of the Court’s aggregate unanimous decisions were unanimous at 
conference, while 42 % were not402 – very nearly the same percentages (60-40 %) that we found 
for major decisions. Thus, while both conference unanimity and ultimate unanimity were 
significantly less likely to be achieved in salient than in nonsalient cases, the likelihood that a 
divided conference vote would ultimately be transformed into a unanimous decision was almost 
the same.  
The fact that two of the most senior Justices – McReynolds and Holmes -- were those 
who most frequently acquiesced in the conference majority’s judgment in major cases also 
indicates that newcomers to the Taft Court did not experience the kind of freshman effect with 
respect to voting fluidity that some scholars have found on other Courts. Though there is no 
agreed-upon period of judicial tenure during which to test for the freshman effect, the periods 
tested in the literature have ranged from one to five years.403 Professor Howard, the first to 
identify the phenomenon, suggested that the freshman period was typically about three years.404 
Yet many of the instances of fluidity exhibited by these freshman Justices were produced well 
into their tenures on the Taft Court, and indeed persisted long after their freshman years had 
                                                          
401 Id. 
402 Id. 
403 Brenner and Hagle, 18 Pol Behav at 239 (cited in note 27).  
404 Howard Jr, 62 Am Pol Sci Rev at 45 (cited in note 24). 
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concluded.405 Taft was the most mobile of the group, manifesting fluidity in ten major cases. The 
Chief Justice acquiesced in one major case (Window Glass Manufacturers) in his third full 
Term,406 two (Industrial Association, Agnello) in his fourth, two (Fasulo, Byars) in his sixth, and 
one (Zimmerman) in his seventh. His one defection (Toyota) occurred in his fourth full Term. 
His three shifts from one conference majority to another occurred in his second (Oliver Iron), 
sixth (Euclid), and seventh (Gambino) full Terms. Moreover, at least some of Taft’s shifts must 
have been prompted not by uncertainty, but instead by a desire to lead by example in cultivating 
the norm of acquiescence.  
Two (Jay Burns, Ziang) of Sutherland’s nine shifts in major cases occurred during his 
second full Term,407 three (Brooks, Buck v Kuykendall, Bush) in his third, two (Metcalf, Trusler) 
in his fourth, and one (Roberge) in his seventh. His shift from one conference majority to another 
in Euclid occurred during his fifth full Term. Butler acquiesced in one major case (Radice) 
during his first Term, and one each during his second (Carroll), third (Corrigan), and fourth 
(Lee) full Terms. His two defections in major cases came in his second (Samuels) and fourth 
(Buck v Bell) full Terms, for a total of six instances of fluidity. Sanford acquiesced in one major 
case in each of his first (Texas Transport), third (Frost), fourth (Duby), and sixth (Roberge) full 
Terms, and two (Carroll, Buck v Kuykendall) in his second. His shift from one conference 
majority to another in Gambino came in his fifth full Term, for a total of seven such instances. 
                                                          
405 See Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court Docket Books: The Early Terms, 1930-1933, 40 J Sup 
Ct Hist 103 (2015); Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court Docket Books: The Late Terms, 1937-
1940, 55 Am J Leg Hist 361 (2015). 
406 As indicated in note 34 and its accompanying text, we do not have a docket book for the 1921 
Term, Taft’s first on the Court, nor for that portion of the 1922 Term antedating Justice Butler’s 
accession to the Court. 
407 As indicated in note 34 and the accompanying text, we do not have docket book entries for 
that portion of the 1922 Term – Sutherland’s first on the Court -- antedating Justice Butler’s 
accession to the Court. 
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Stone, who was on the Taft Court for a shorter time than his other freshman colleagues, 
acquiesced in one major case (Miles v Graham) in his first Term on the Court, in one (Nectow) 
during his third full Term, and in two (Helson, Roberge) during his fourth. His defection in 
Ribnik came during his third full Term, giving him a total of five instances of fluidity. Moreover, 
Stone and Butler were the only participants in the original Gambino conference to vote for the 
Court’s ultimate disposition. By contrast, McReynolds exhibited nineteen instances of fluidity,408 
Holmes fourteen,409 Brandeis eight,410 and Van Devanter six.411 The freshman Justices of the 
Taft Court were not markedly more likely than were their senior colleagues to change their votes 
between the conference and the final vote on the merits. Indeed, these five Justices together 
accounted for considerably fewer instances of fluidity in major cases than did the senior quartet 
of McReynolds, Holmes, Brandeis, and Van Devanter.412 
                                                          
408 He acquiesced in Radice, Brooks, Window Glass Manufacturers, Panama Railroad, Roberge, 
Fiske, Yu Cong Eng, Fasulo, Byars, Ziang, Cooke, Black and White Taxicab, Liggett, West, and 
on the jurisdictional issue in Tyson; defected in Carroll, Haydel, and One Ford Coupe; and 
shifted from the initial conference majority to support a contrary disposition in Oliver Iron. 
409 He acquiesced Coronado Coal, Duke, Nectow, Duby, Yu Cong Eng, Agnello, Olsen, Miles, 
Shafer, Byars, on the jurisdictional issue in Tyson, and in the judgment in Whitney; he defected 
in Helson; and he shifted from the initial conference majority to support a contrary disposition in 
Gambino. 
410 He acquiesced in Coronado Coal, Nectow, Corrigan, McGrain, and Helson, in the judgment 
in Whitney, on the jurisdictional issue in Tyson, and shifted from the initial conference majority 
to support a contrary disposition in Gambino. 
411 He acquiesced in Radice, Trusler, Corrigan, and Ziang, and shifted from the initial 
conference majority to support a contrary disposition in Oliver Iron and Gambino. 
412 Taft (10), Sutherland (9), Sanford (7), Butler (6), and Stone (5) accounted together for thirty-
seven instances of fluidity. McReynolds (19), Holmes (14), Brandeis (8), and Van Devanter (6) 
accounted together for forty-seven. Other studies have shown that newcomers to the Taft Court 
did not demonstrate a freshman effect with respect to bloc voting. See Dudley, 21 Am Polit Q at 
364-65 (cited in note 29); Bowen and Scheb II, 15 Pol Behav at 7, 11 (cited in note 29). Further 
research will be necessary to determine whether freshman Justices demonstrated greater degrees 
of vacillation in less salient cases than they did in the major cases discussed here. Paul Freund 
reported that, “As far as I could make out, [Cardozo’s] disagreements [with the majority in 
conference] -- this being his first full term on the Court -- derived from the fact that in New York 
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Of course, there are limits to what the docket books alone can teach us. Though they can 
document voting shifts between conference and published opinion, they typically do not reveal 
the reasons underlying such shifts.413 Often they do not reveal the strength of preference 
underlying a conference vote, nor the force of persuasion required for that vote to change. The 
docket books typically do not reveal the extent to which a passing vote is explained by genuine 
indecision on the merits, a desire to see a draft of the majority opinion and its reasoning before 
making a commitment, or, as one might have reason to suspect in the case of McReynolds based 
on the assessment of one of his later clerks, a lack of preparation.414 The docket books often do 
not reveal whether senior Justices, who spoke first but voted last, might have cast votes at 
variance with their expressed views in order to acquiesce in an emerging majority or, in the case 
of the Chief Justice or the most senior Associate Justice, to control assignment of the majority 
opinion.415 For answers to these questions we must rely upon other sources or educated 
speculation, and to many of these issues we may never have satisfactory resolutions. But the 
information contained in the docket books permits us to answer a number of questions about the 
                                                          
he had been accustomed to a rather different set of procedural rules and substantive rules 
intermeshed with procedure, so that some things which were decided one way in the federal 
courts would have been decided differently in New York,” and that this is what may have 
accounted for the Justice’s allegedly frequent changes of vote between the conference and the 
final vote on the merits. Freund, 26 Ohio St L J at 227 (cited in note 31). This suggests the 
possibility that in some instances a greater degree of freshman vote fluidity might be exhibited in 
less salient cases. 
413 For discussions of various possibilities, see, for example, Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth, 45 Am J 
Pol Sci at 372-73 (cited in note 20); Saul Brenner, Minimum Winning Coalitions on the United 
States Supreme Court: A Comparison of the Original Vote on the Merits with the Opinion Vote, 
7 Am Polit Q 384, 391-92 (1979); Howard Jr, 62 Am Pol Sci Rev at 45-51 (cited in note 24). 
414 John Knox, Experiences as a Law Clerk to Mr. Justice James C. McReynolds of the Supreme 
Court of the United States during the Year that President Franklin D. Roosevelt Attempted to 
“Pack” the Court *vi (unpublished manuscript, Oct Term 1936, available at John Knox MSS, 
Special Collections, University of Virginia Library) (describing McReynolds as “genuinely 
lazy”). 
415 See Johnson, Spriggs II, and Wahlbeck, 39 L & Society Rev 349 (cited in note 33). 
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Taft Court, allows us to corroborate or confute a variety of scholarly claims, and opens avenues 
of investigation that previously had been obstructed or closed. 
